From the ‘Special Relationship’ to a ‘Four-Dimensional Puzzle’:

Fifty-Nine Years of Anglo-American Relations at Ditchley

# the author

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# Summary:

Since being founded in 1958 as an ‘educational centre for the study of Anglo-American relations by the conference method’, few phrases have echoed around Ditchley as frequently as the ‘special relationship.’ A term popularised by Winston Churchill in 1946 to reflect Britain and the United States’ perceived shared experiences, cultures, and values, Ditchley participants have subsequently tested, criticised, and reformulated this relationship over fifty-nine years of global geopolitical change. As Ditchley discussions have consistently stressed, the ‘special relationship’ has always reflected both pre-existing practical ties in geopolitical cooperation, economic aid, and international cultural diplomacy; and an ideological attempt to will into being something greater: a tie sufficiently embedded in both nation’s ‘hearts and minds’ to survive regardless of Britain’s declining global stature. Yet it is also a term which has inspired obituaries and ‘end of the affair’ predictions aplenty. For recent sceptics, including by some accounts Boris Johnson, the term may appear overly sentimental and ultimately contrary to the wide-ranging multilateral aims of a re-assertive ‘Global Britain.’

*This piece draws predominantly on Ditchley’s Annual Lectures. Typically attended by around three hundred guests from diverse backgrounds including politics, business, academia, and tech, the Annual Lecture allows Ditchley to ‘crystallise one or more of its major themes, to gather its network and to draw in new talent.’ There have been a total of 57 Annual Lectures since Ditchley’s Inaugural Annual Lecture, H.V. Hodson’s 1962 ‘The Anatomy of Anglo-American Relations.’ Many of these discussed Anglo-American themes extensively.* This source-base consequently provides a unique perspective on the past half-century or so’s attempts to revise and reformulate Anglo-American ties whilst staying faithful to this supposedly timeless connection’s essential values and shared historical ties.

# The Origins of Ditchley

From its early private owners to its transformation by Sir David Wills into an educational centre in 1958, Anglo-American ties have long converged at Ditchley. For some three and a half centuries after 1583, Ditchley was the home of the descendants of Henry Lee of Ditchley, a Queen’s Champion under Elizabeth I. Whilst there is no family link with the prominent Lee family that was centered around colonial Virginia and had notable American descendants including General Robert E. Lee, Henry Lee’s maternal family had a close association with the Lees of Shropshire from whom the general was descended.

In 1933 Ditchley was purchased by the Anglo-American Conservative MP for Harborough, Ronald Tree, who charitably described Ditchley as ‘an unforgettable picture of magnificence and accumulated junk.’ The house had no electricity and only one functioning bathroom, which led the prior owner, Lord Dillon, habitually to place his bathtub in the dining room’s fireplace. Under Ronald Tree and his first wife Nancy, who later became a famed decorator, Ditchley was consequently reconditioned and modernised with the collaboration of Lady Colefax and the French decorator Stéphane Boudin.

Under the Trees’ direction, Ditchley soon became a prominent meeting place for British and American guests. Ronald Tree’s parents were both American and during WWII he crossed the Atlantic on multiple occasions, attempting to convince the U.S. to join the side of the Allies. His second wife, Marietta Peabody Tree, was also American, born in Massachusetts, and she became notable within the American Democratic Party after the couple left Ditchley for America. Most famously, Winston Churchill visited Ditchley on thirteen occasions from 1940 to 1942, having been warned that both Chequers and Chartwell were vulnerable to Luftwaffe bombings. Churchill’s notable guests at Ditchley included prominent Cabinet members such as Brendan Bracken, Anthony Eden and Duff Cooper; the exiled Czechoslovakian President Edvard Beneš; and the U.S. Secretary of Commerce W. Averell Harriman. It was during several late-night discussions at Ditchley that Churchill and FDR’s chief diplomatic aid Harry Hopkins formulated the extensive Lend-Lease aid program that saw the U.S. provide $31.4 billion of aid in food, oil, and armaments to Britain’s war effort. Ditchley was consequently a key catalyst in precisely that war-time convergence of Anglo-American interests that led Churchill to popularise the term ‘special relationship’ in his March 1946 ‘Sinews of Peace Address’ in Fulton, Missouri. It seemed, recalled Tree’s memoirs, that ‘there was a general sense of something new and big in the air.’

In 1953 Ditchley was purchased by the philanthropist Sir David Wills, principally for its farmland. Sir David had served in WWII and lost his brother in the North African Campaign, leaving him with a deeply personal appreciation for the benefits of global understanding and peace, particularly when bolstered by the Anglo-American connection. By 1958, after a careful consultation process including Isaiah Berlin and others, Sir David aimed to transform Ditchley into ‘an educational centre for the study of Anglo-American relations by the conference method’ to that end. The emphasis was on dialogue and deliberation, uniting those with first-hand experience and expertise on key political issues in a rural environment conducive to extended reflection. This philosophy governs Ditchley’s operations to this day. Wills’s project also received ‘warm and wholehearted support’ from the U.S. Embassy. Anglo-American themes were consequently frequent in early discussions at Ditchley, encompassing a major theme of eight out of the first nine Annual Lectures, of which three were given by Americans and three by Britons.

# ‘more attente than détente’- The 1960s

## the 1960s context

As Ditchley held its first meetings in 1962, Anglo-American relations were at an ostensible high watermark despite the unprecedented difficulties of the Suez crisis only six years earlier. For example, the historian Robert M. Hendershot notes that the percentage of Britons reporting a ‘great deal’ of trust in the U.S. rose from 25 percent in 1957 to 56 percent in 1961. Likewise, a February 1963 Gallup Poll found that a majority of surveyed Americans believed Britain to be America’s most trustworthy ally. Nevertheless, this remained a *relative* ‘golden age’ sandwiched between two *relative* crises. In the historian Robert Hathaway’s terms, the years from 1957 to 1963 during which Harold Macmillan was Prime Minister were those of an ‘alliance sustained’ by contrast to those of an ‘alliance threatened’ around Suez in 1956 and an ‘alliance depreciated’ under Harold Wilson and Ted Heath from 1964 to 1976.

Ultimately, any perceived ‘golden age’ in Anglo-American relations only masked the gradual and inescapable decline of Britain’s global power and substantial uncertainty concerning its relationship to the growing European Economic Community, which Macmillan applied to join in the summer of 1961. As the Director’s Note from June 1967’s ‘Paths to an Atlantic Community’ observed, there could be ‘no certainty about the political character of an enlarged EEC.’ Nevertheless the Director’s Note from June 1963’s conference ‘The British and American Past, and the Atlantic Future’ observed that it was clear that ‘the majority of British people want Britain to remain a ‘world power’, even if a second-rank one.’ This meant that most aspects of British foreign policy became ‘entangled with that of the balance between a primarily European or Atlantic defence policy and one of involvement in the security of distant parts of the world, especially in the Indian Ocean.’ Britain’s consequent walking of a geopolitical tightrope was evident in a particularly sobering assessment of Britain’s geopolitical role in the 1960s provided by the ‘Grand Design’ Macmillan wrote over the New Year of 1960-1961:

‘Britain-with all her experience- has neither the economic nor the military power to take the leading role. We are harassed with countless problems- the narrow knife-edge on which our own economy is balanced; the difficult task of changing an Empire into a Commonwealth…the uncertainty about our relations [with] the new economic, and perhaps political, state which is being created by the Six countries of continental Western Europe; and the uncertainty of American policies towards us- treated now as just another country, now as an ally in a special and unique category.’

For their part, Americans shared such concerns. Anglo-American relations in the 1960s were continually complicated by America’s consistently rejected calls for Britain to contribute even a ‘platoon of bagpipers’ to the Vietnam War, which President Johnson believed would substantially improve the war’s legitimacy and bolster domestic support for it. With Macmillan accelerating the decolonisation of Africa and visiting Moscow in 1959, many Americans expressed uncertainty regarding Britain’s commitment to combating Communism and its ultimate strategic aims. In the 1966 judgement of the American ambassador to Britain David Bruce, the ‘special relationship’ was ‘now little more than sentimental terminology, although the underground waters of it flow with a deep current.’ Conversely, when an American U-2 spy plane was shot down near Yekaterinburg in May 1960, days before the critical Paris Summit, America’s Cold War strategic priorities directly frustrated Macmillan’s wishes to act as a Churchillian summit leader and bridge between the two superpowers. For Macmillan, it starkly illustrated that Britain could no longer subtly steer a hard-headed and assertive Cold War era America. For the former U.S. Secretary of State Dean Acheson, however, it seemed that Britain’s role was ‘about played out.’ It had ‘lost an empire but not yet found a role.’

## The 1960s at Ditchley

The consequently sombre tone of Ditchley discussions concerning the Anglo-American relationship was marked from the inaugural Annual Lecture of April 27th 1962 ‘The Anatomy of Anglo-American Relations.’ This was given by the economist, assistant editor of the *Sunday Times* and first Provost of DitchleyH.V. Hodson, whom the *Sunday Times* described as having ‘a wide experience of Anglo-American relations in particular and of Commonwealth and international affairs generally.’ As the diplomatic historian Sir John Wheeler-Bennett observed in introducing Hodson:

‘The importance of what will be done at Ditchley over the coming months and years lies in the fact that never was there a moment in history when a close and indestructible understanding between Britain and America was more vitally necessary, more desperately needed than it is today. No less a thing than the peace of the world may depend upon it and even, perhaps the survival of mankind.’

Mr Hodson’s speech was equally wary, stressing that Anglo-American relations could not be taken for granted and required ‘constant effort, care and refreshment.’ Adopting a detached, ‘scientific’ position as an ‘anatomist’ of Anglo-American relations, Hodson argued that ‘the basic geopolitical interests of the United States and Britain are, on the surface, far more contrasted than alike.’ The contiguous United States was a continent in and of itself, bounded by weak neighbours and vast oceans. The United Kingdom was, by contrast, a ‘mere island, on the edge of Europe’ bounded by a powerful France and Germany. This made the ‘special relationship’ an ‘unlikely phenomenon… between two different animals of the jungle.’ Yet the complementary interests of Britain and the United States in their respective imperial spheres, in addition to ‘common ideals and a sense of community, itself deep-rooted in common culture and personal connections’ maintained a basic level of implicit agreement. As the *Sunday Times* concluded in citing Hodson’s lecture, ‘except in certain details, the general identity of policy and purpose in the field of foreign affairs between this country and the U.S. had rarely been closer.’

Born in Edmonton London in 1906, Henry Vincent ‘Harry’ Hodson was All Souls College Oxford’s first Economics Fellow before entering journalism via a war-time role at the Ministry of Information. As an academic and civil servant, he was, noted Geoffrey Hodgson’s obituary of Hodson, a ‘liberal imperialist…concerned to devise structures that would allow gradual progress in the direction of self-government.’

Hodson’s long career in journalism included a role from 1950 to 1961 as assistant editor of *The Sunday Times*, during which circulation nearly doubled and passed one million, and a chief editor role at *The Annual Register* from 1973 until 1988. With his ‘elegant bowler hat,’ ‘rolled umbrella’ and contractual agreement barring him from being forced to work on Saturdays, Hodson was something of a dying breed of ‘gentlemanly’ journalist by the late 20th-century. Noted Hodgson, ‘he both looked the part and clearly enjoyed playing it.’

H.V. Hodson, 1906-1999

Nevertheless, Hodson emphasised that Anglo-American diplomacy was complicated by the ongoing dissolution of the British Empire, a process Hodson believed historically anti-colonial American opinion wished to be accelerated. This difference of opinion, rooted in America’s revolutionary heritage, was ‘manifestly still with us today, erupting over the Congo, over Central Africa and elsewhere.’ Indeed, Hodson observed that the empire’s ‘rapid self-liquidation’ could even ease the British ‘suspicion and distrust’ created by this American impatience. Likewise, two months later Hodson concluded the conference ‘British and American Policies in Tropical Africa’ by noting the participants’ recognition that ‘basic American and British interests in Tropical Africa were identical, namely, to help the African peoples of all races, in line with their own wishes, to achieve and maintain, in peace, effective independence on a sound economic basis.’ The dispute was merely over ‘timing and method.’

The non-exclusivity of Anglo-Americans relations within the Cold War context was also stressed in Ditchley’s second Annual Lecture in 1963, General Lauris Norstad’s ‘The Dimensions of the Atlantic Alliance.’ General Norstad, the Commander-in-Chief of U.S. European Command, lamented that NATO was in ‘disarray’, citing the diminishing appeal of the concept of interdependence. Whilst British commentators usually traced NATO’s issues to the French, Norstad emphasised that NATO had always relied heavily upon America, particularly in its formative years. As European nations recovered from WWII, however, NATO struggled to provide an equitable mechanism for deploying military power and developing nuclear capacities which would ‘be consistent with the spirit of collective responsibility, yet which also would recognize the needs of individual member nations.’ Whilst the Atlantic Alliance grew ‘with each year, and, within the year, with each crisis faced, with each problem seized’, Norstad emphasised that Europe ultimately had to be prepared to go to war to prevent war, concluding by warning that ‘threats, crises, disarray—these mark this time of our responsibility.’

If Anglo-Americans relations were inseparable from European relations, Ditchley’s mid-1960s Annual Lectures equally emphasised the stakes for the wider ‘Anglosphere.’ On June 19th, 1964, the Canadian lawyer and diplomat Arnold Heeney QC mourned the ‘familiar, if unpleasant, certainties’ of the early Cold War, when Western objectives were ‘stern, but they were not hard to agree upon.’ By contrast, Heeney suggested, it was now ‘painfully evident that our situation is now in the process of such radical change as to demand serious re-examination of many accepted policies and reassessment of much traditional doctrine.’ The ‘special relationship’ particularly demanded further scrutiny. There was a risk in over-emphasising ties of blood and language, of creating double standards and preferential treatments which often ‘compounded intrinsic difficulties’ and obscured practical realities. Particularly as the Commonwealth became more diverse and London’s central power declined, Heeney instead encouraged Britain to adopt a wide-ranging tone of ‘friendship and frankness,’ an emphasis on recognising and reconciling differences rather than denying their existence. This would ultimately allow the Atlantic Alliance and the Commonwealth to ‘exploit most effectively the great and diverse assets we severally possess and, in so doing, co-operate most constructively with other nations in the incredibly complex task of human survival.’

Born in Boston, Massachusetts in 1919, McGeorge Bundy filtered between academic roles as a Harvard Dean in his early life; government roles as the U.S. National Security Advisor under Presidents Kennedy and Johnson; a Presidency at the Ford Foundation and a final stint as a scholar-in-residence at the Carnegie Corporation before his death in 1996.

His remarkable educational pedigree and strong New England background exemplified the ‘Best and the Brightest,’ that confident new wave of intellectuals eagerly welcomed into John F. Kennedy’s ‘Camelot’ of a White House. Noted the journalist David Halberstam, Bundy was ‘perhaps the brightest star in the galaxy of brilliant young men who were going to change the course of the country, his reputation was above all else for his intellectual brilliance.'

Bundy is best known, however, for forcefully advocating for increased U.S. involvement in the Vietnam War via the policy of ‘sustained reprisal.’ Nevertheless, he increasingly advised LBJ against further escalation before resigning in 1966 to become President of the Ford Federation. One year before his 1969 Annual Lecture at Ditchley, Bundy concluded that ‘there is no prospect of military victory against North Vietnam by any level of U.S. military force which is acceptable or desirable.’

mcgeorge bundy, 1919-1996

Heeney’s pragmatic analysis was also echoed in Ditchley’s fourth Annual Lecture, Lord Caccia’s 5th November 1965 Lecture ‘The Roots of British Foreign Policy.’ Caccia, who had just retired from the role of Permanent Under-Secretary of State following a storied career in British diplomacy, observed that Britain had the 75th largest landmass, only two percent of the world’s population, provided only half the food it ate and had one major natural resource—coal. Recognising the ‘economic necessity’ and ‘national temper’ that consequently produced Britain’s ‘constant and predictable’ foreign policy, Lord Caccia concluded that Britain would remain a worldwide power yet could not ‘with any credibility, be forced into the straight-jacket of a role.’ It merely had to follow its abiding interests, the parameters set by its geographical birthright. Revealingly, Ditchley’s first four Annual Lectures all featured degrees of this markedly pragmatic mode of analysing Britain’s global role, a Hodson-esque ‘anatomist’ position that, whilst still frequently couched in national pride, had no doubts as to the colossal problems Britain faced going forward.

Whilst exclusive discussions of the Anglo-American relationship gradually became less frequent towards the conclusion of the 1960s, there was a clear awareness of geopolitical change as Soviet-American relations moved gradually towards détente. In his 1968 Annual Lecture ‘An International Weather Forecast’, the former Prime Minister Sir Alec Douglas-Home argued that ‘as of today the international barometer [i.e., the threat of war] is at a new low.’ ‘An analysis of human tendencies reveals a trend towards coexistence which is positive. Perhaps this is optimism, perhaps faith, perhaps they are the same thing.’

Ditchley’s American Annual Lecturers, however, painted a markedly more pessimistic domestic and international panorama. In July 1969 JFK and LBJ’s former U.S. National Security Advisor McGeorge Bundy’s Annual Lecture ‘The Americans Europe: Rhetoric and Reality’ argued that the years from 1964 to 1969 marked a third phase of the Cold War, a ‘time of waiting,’ of ‘some détente, but rather more attente.’ Americans were chiefly preoccupied with Vietnam and the resultant domestic anti-war activism, particularly within inner city communities already energised by the civil rights movement. Nevertheless, America remained integral to the safety of Europe. More precisely, its nuclear strength was ‘the decisive military element in the safety of Western Europe’, yoking stability and peace in Europe to weapons whose actual use would represent a ‘confession of terrible failure.’ This ‘inevitable dependence’ meant, however, that Europe’s fate was closely tied to American domestic unity, an issue whilst presidential powers over nuclear weapons were increasingly challenged by both Houses of Congress. America, Bundy warned, was experiencing a ‘test of internal stability… more searching and more shaking than anything we have known since the Great Depression.’ Its political centre-ground was ‘hard pressed’ and if it collapsed, ‘there could come a day when the commitment of the United States would become doubtful, because of a new American radicalism, or undesirable, because of a new American reaction.’ Here, Bundy seems remarkably prescient: as John Kerry quipped in his 2017 Annual Lecture, ‘I don’t know what kind of crystal ball he had.’

Moreover, Bundy lamented that much of Western Europe (including the United Kingdom) ‘may prefer not to have a serious foreign policy anymore.’ In Bundy’s opinion, Americans had for too long attempted to offer an answer as to where Europeans (and, by extension, the British) ultimately wished to go, whilst Europeans ‘allowed this American rhetoric to serve as a substitute for the reality of decisions by Europeans.’ Ultimately, only Europeans could unify Europe. Only Europeans could state European opinions on arms control talks and build an interconnected European trading economy strong enough to withstand international economic instability.

Bundy consequently ended by the 1960s by summarising a key theme in Britain’s experience of the decade—a grasping for a coherent approach to foreign policy whilst careering between perpetual imperial and economic crises that only further sapped its national confidence. America’s task was to soothe these psychological wounds, steering Britain into a foreign policy conducive to its own Cold War aims through an implicit rhetoric of Anglo-American civilizational collaboration. In concluding, Bundy acknowledged that such matters were ‘terribly complex.’ Yet, he noted:

‘It is also simple. It is as simple as the fact that there really is a common interest among us and as simple as the fact that in the end we have no better choice. This rhetoric is reality or can be if we make it so. This simplicity is what can sustain us in the understanding of what is complex and the resolution of what is hard. If we hold to this conviction, the fourth phase can be worthy of the best of the first three.’

# America’s discontents revealed- The 1970s

## the 1970s context

Bundy’s hopes for this ‘fourth phase’ were to go largely unmet. In fact, the 1970s in America appeared to have packed so many ‘phases’ into ten years as to undermine the concept altogether. As a decade, the 1970s have been treated by many historians as one of acute crisis and societal fracture. Observed the Director’s Note from 1976’s conference ‘Britain and America: Problems and Opportunities,’ ‘in recent years we have become less certain about the survival of our adaptive, pluralistic societies and their capacity to ‘muddle through.’ Cascading economic crises, a humiliating defeat in Vietnam, ongoing domestic unrest, and a wave of domestic political apathy and scepticism in the wake of Richard Nixon’s resignation following Watergate compounded the hesitant politics of a decade already destabilised by late-stage decolonisation and economic globalisation. America, the Note added, was ‘hurt.’ ‘The failure of her hopes and the repudiation of her philosophy left her feeling betrayed, insecure and directionless.’

Many Ditchley participants also feared that a new generation who had not lived through WWII and possessed fewer ties to traditional centres of political power would repudiate both nations’ Cold War commitments. For example, the Dutch Secretary-General of NATO Dr Joseph Luns’s 1973 Annual Lecture predicted that ‘we shall be urged to relax long before it is safe to do so,’ warning that the USSR and the U.S.’s ideological incompatibility remained ‘essentially untouched.’ It seemed, as the historian Fritz Stern observed in 1972, that ‘the post-war era is over… gone, too, are the simple—perhaps dangerously simple—certainties that went with it.’

Equally, Britain’s power had demonstrably declined. In the judgement of the historian David Reynolds and the journalist David Dimbleby, ‘Britain no longer mattered . . . as a world power or as a political example.’ The historian Steve Marsh details that ‘Britain’s GNP, second in 1950, was only the sixth-largest in 1973, its share of world trade dwindled from 11 per cent in 1950 to under 6 per cent in 1973, and its military manpower had slipped from fourth position in 1950 to fifteenth in 1973.’ Britain’s overseas territories now covered 700,000 square miles and 5 million people, by contrast to 6.4 million square miles and 500 million people in 1945.

Born in Houston, Texas in 1936, Barbara Jordan was a politician, lawyer, educator, and prominent figure in the U.S. Civil Rights Movement. Her father sought for her to be a musician, believing it to be one of few jobs available to a black woman. Jordan, however, quit her piano lessons aged eleven, answering her bemused father’s question as to what else she aimed to do: ‘I don't know…but I'll manage somehow.’ Jordan went on to receive a Boston University Law Degree in 1959 after attending Texas Southern University, which her father paid for by moonlighting as a warehouse clerk. ‘We were poor,’ recalled Jordan of her upbringing, ‘but so was everyone around us, so we did not notice it.’

Following a key role in Houston voter drives for JFK’s 1960 Presidential Bid, in 1967 Jordan became the first African American to be elected to the Texas Senate since 1883. By 1973, she became the first African American woman to be elected to the U.S. House of Representatives from the South, after which she came to be known nationwide following her opening statement in impeachment proceedings against Richard Nixon. An ardent civil rights activist who reportedly carried the U.S. constitution in her wallet wherever she went, Jordan noted that ‘my faith in the Constitution is whole, it is complete, it is total, and I am not going to sit here and be an idle spectator to the diminution, the subversion, the destruction of the Constitution.’

Her Ditchley Lecture of 1976 preceded a historic first as she became the first woman to deliver a keynote address at the 1976 Democratic National Convention in Madison Square Garden. Having retired from politics in 1979, Jordan went on to teach political ethics at the University of Texas’s School of Public Affairs, lecturing from her wheelchair before she passed away aged 59 in 1996.

barbara jordan, 1936-1996

As Anglo-American relations became increasingly asymmetric, various Americans consequently took to calling for a less exclusive relationship, particularly after the United Kingdom finally joined the European Economic Community on January 1st, 1973. In Henry Kissinger’s observation of December 1973, what America now needed was a ‘special relationship with Europe.’ The Director’s Notes of June 1976’s conference ‘Britain and America: Problems and Opportunities’ observed that Britain had ‘clung to the vestiges of her former power and America indulged her in this propensity.’ For America itself, this special relationship had been ‘little of a help and something of a burden.’ It was ‘at best, a damage-limiting device, inhibiting the partners from certain potentially dangerous alternatives and the moves towards them.’

## The 1970s at Ditchley

As détente quietened the Cold War, Ditchley’s attention turned to new, wide-ranging, and multi-dimensional issues including the environment and international economic stability. These affected multiple nations simultaneously and seemingly demanded international cooperation and problem-solving beyond the narrow bilateral parameters of the ‘special relationship.’ Ditchley’s Annual Lectures reflected this, as attention was paid to issues new to the series including interdependence, the environment, and historical exemplars of the ‘universal man.’ Even when discussing Anglo-American relations, Group C of the November 1971 conference ‘The Bases of Foreign Policy’ analysed the far broader topic of ‘the impact on U.S. and UK foreign policy in the 1970s of the changing balance between resources and population.’ Whilst once more three of the decade’s Annual Lecturers were Americans, of three lectures related to America two adopted the geographical frame of ‘America and Europe’ whilst one, Barbara Jordan’s of 1976, looked nearly exclusively to America’s domestic situation. In fact, Ditchley’s Annual Lecturers of the 1970s never utilised the phrase ‘special relationship.’

If the 1970s had one common theme, it was that no post-war verity went unchallenged. Anglo-American ties were no exception. In 1976, a Ditchley Director’s Note warned that ‘a new generation… with a leadership that is more diffuse and a socio-economic habitat more various, may feel less instinctive sympathy for the traditional assumption of a special Anglo-American link.’ It was further noted that Britain and America had ‘an episodic but durable relationship and share an empirical, common-sensical outlook. Our connection is a good one partly because it is uneven and often abrasive. We criticise each other but, when we need it, we each perceive an idealized version of the other’s country.’

Of course, Britain’s entry into the European Economic Community on January 1st 1973 complicated matters further. The Director’s Note from the April 1971 conference ‘The Future of the European Economic Community and its Implications for European-American Relations’ argued that Europeans believed the special relationship to be an ‘obstacle’ to Britain’s accession. Nevertheless, one participant claimed that this was a ‘false issue’—Americans instead hoped that the Anglo-American relationship would be ‘diversified through Community enlargement.’ Whilst ‘American fear of the unknown associated with the emergence of a new big bloc’ presented a ‘psychological barrier’, it was concluded that America wished ‘to have good relations with one strong partner rather than with a variety of different sizes.’ As the Director’s Note from 1976’s ‘Britain and America: Problems and Opportunities’ conference observed, this was now ‘more of an American-EEC relationship, with Britain as that member of the Community with which America feels she shares some deeper, resilient understanding.’

Ditchley discussions on America during the 1970s frequently turned to domestic matters. This was particularly clear in 1976, the two-hundred-year anniversary of America’s Declaration of Independence. The gravity of the occasion saw commentators in both America and Ditchley mark a prolonged and frequently disconcerting period of reflection. In the historian Christopher Capozzola’s words, America’s ‘ambivalent Bicentennial revealed a nation engaged in a vigorous battle over the terrain of political meaning, but strikingly unaware that the ground was then shifting under its feet.’ That year, Congresswoman Barbara Jordan conducted Ditchley’s Annual Lecture ‘America’s Imports Revalued: The Tributaries of American Culture.’ A prominent Texas State Senator from 1966 to 1972 and Democratic Representative for Texas’s 18th District from 1973 to 1979, Jordan rose to national attention following her speech in the opening procedures of the July 1974 impeachment process against Richard Nixon. A unique Ditchley Lecturer in being both African American and a woman, Jordan brought such eloquence to Ditchley, using it as a precursor to her keynote speech at 1976’s Democratic National Convention several days later.

Reflecting a widespread argument amongst contemporary cultural critics, Jordan’s lecture pointed to a perceived loss of consensus and *civitas* within American politics, *civitas* being ‘the spontaneous willingness to obey the law, to respect the rights of others, to forego the temptations of private enrichment at the expense of the public weal.’ If this was not recovered, Jordan argued, representative democracy itself was imperilled by the rise of ‘participatory democracy.’ Citing the Harvard sociologist Daniel Bell, Jordan suggested that the expansion of the franchise (e.g., to African American voters) and the greater complexity of governing in the mid-twentieth century slowed the political process. Specific groups with specific interests made specific requests which had to be mediated to form one coherent policy, creating a generalised and pernicious sense of powerlessness. Despite the excessive promises of the post-war welfare state, no voter had all their desires met. Increased participation, in short, led to increased frustration.

To recover a sense of societal consensus and shared values, Jordan suggested that Americans had to ‘think in terms of the whole rather than the particular’, to doubt the infinite promises of new technologies, to look beyond the present and to realise the limits on government’s capacities and promises. America had long been an ideological state that imposed utopian pressures on its Presidents, yet Jordan encouraged a middle-ground between idealism and realism, particularly with regards to foreign policy. Future Presidents had to remember that ‘what a country stands for is often more important than what it actually does’ and that ‘a President must build the consensus first and then act.’ As for the Anglo-American connection, Jordan’s Annual Lecture highlighted a wider shift of the 1970s: those social, cultural, and economic ties which always bulwarked Anglo-American partnership through an infinite number of infinitely varied individual interactions increasingly appeared to be acting against the wishes of central policymakers. By the twentieth-first century, it is now arguable that these underlying ties carry the weight of an Anglo-American partnership that would otherwise be continually frustrated by that same torpidity and partisanship of contemporary ‘high’ politics lamented by Jordan.

# Reagan, thatcher, and change and continuity in the 1980s

## the 1980s context

By contrast to the 1970s, the 1980s seemed to present an alluringly straightforward narrative. Ronald Reagan and Margaret Thatcher’s leadership represented not only a period of relative domestic stability, but quickly became a symbolic exemplar of Anglo-American ties. Both leaders demonstrated a consistent appetite for garnishing substantial agreement regarding the virtues of unfettered free-market capitalism and the threat of the Soviet Union with determinedly rosy rhetoric and genuine personal friendship. For example, the fifteen Anglo-American summits held during Reagan’s Presidency represented a Presidential record. In a 1985 dinner in D.C. celebrating two centuries of Anglo-American diplomatic relations, Thatcher announced that ‘there is a union of mind and purpose between our peoples which is remarkable and which makes our relationship truly a remarkable one. It is special. It just is, and that's that.’

If Reagan and Thatcher’s special relationship proved historically unique, it was nonetheless felicitously timed, temporarily masking a greater unease concerning the Anglo-American connection’s ‘fundamentals.’ The Reagan-Thatcher axis did not eradicate geopolitical differences, with the U.S. invasion of Grenada in 1983 and British policy towards Northern Ireland causing marked disagreement. Director’s Notes from 1983’s conference ‘The Atlantic Partners: Cooperation and Diversity’ described a partnership under threat, suggesting that ‘the majority of the group seemed to agree that the problems were worse than at any previous time, partly because a number of long-term economic and political issues now present harsher difficulties than in the past, and partly because of a change in the balance of economic and political power between the two sides of the Alliance.’ Now wedded into European politics, Britain had to act as a bridge between continental Europe and the United States, easing tensions created by Europe’s economic difficulties, its less stringent commitment to anti-Communism, and its perceived disinclination to pay for its own defence. As an American participant in February 1985’s conference ‘Strategic Interests, Defense and Arms Control’ observed, Uncle Sam feared being ‘played for a sucker.’

If America’s problems were Britain’s problems, there were problems aplenty. Again, much concern was expressed concerning generational issues, the political scientist Robert A. Wampler’s report regarding the September 1984 conference ‘The Anglo-American Alliance since 1945’ recommending that ‘the ‘successor generation’ must be educated in the history of mutual effort in the defense of common values and interests that have for so long marked Anglo-American relations.’ Within America, this was exacerbated by a marked shift in political leadership from an East Coast ‘establishment’ (who were often assumed to be more Anglophile) to a *nouveau* elite of the Sunbelt and West Coast typified by Reagan. Wampler also adjudged that American political opinion was abandoning the centre— whilst the ‘fortuitous coincidence’ of Thatcher and Reagan’s overlapping leaderships had allowed a ‘certain degree of philosophical agreement on policy’ it was warned that ‘should this situation end, disagreement could widen significantly.’

## The 1980s at Ditchley

Within Ditchley, the overall trajectory towards greater diversity continued apace. Whilst three of the decade’s lecturers were again American, the 1980s saw the first Annual Lectures on the politics of Australia and Japan whilst geographical frames of reference for the ‘West’ switched to more capacious terms including the ‘Atlantic Alliance,’ ‘Western Democracy,’ and a post-Cold War ‘New Concert of Europe.’ This was particularly apparent when discussing the need for dramatic economic readjustments within industrialised economies following the fall of Bretton Woods. As early as 1976, Ditchley Conference Notes recognised that the ‘narrow framework of the Anglo-American relationship has been increasingly difficult to describe and as a context of discussion, increasingly constricting.’ This transition was accelerated at Ditchley through the 1982 appointment of the former British Ambassador to France Sir Reginald Hibbert as Ditchley’s Director, whomthe *Guardian* described as a ‘convinced European.’ Hibbert, it noted, wished to ‘widen the European dimension, reminding everybody involved that there is more to Europe than Britain.’

Ditchley’s Anglo-American ethos still found a symbolic outlet in a much-belated gift to celebrate America’s 1976 Bicentennial, replicas of the bells of Westminster Abbey. After a delay whilst a suitable home was found, these ‘Ditchley Bells’ were finally installed in Washington D.C.’s Old Post Office Building in March 1983, appropriately opposite the White House. Seventy-eight per cent copper, twenty-two per cent tin and cast in a mould of London clay, cow’s hair and horse manure, the bells carried the seals of the United States and Britannia and the flower London Pride. The emphasis was determinedly on pomp and circumstance: as one Ditchley spokesman observed, a ‘great peal of bells… can provide that occasional… inspiration which helps to drive civilization on its way.’ In 1982 American Ditchley members gathered at the F Street Club in D.C for a preview of these Ditchley Bells, from which the *Washington Post* quoted several Americans’ fond memories of Ditchley. The former Ambassador to Egypt Lucius D. Battle keenly observed that the Anglo-American relationship was ‘the most important relationship left for us.’ Even more enthusiastically, one anonymous Ditchley alumnus noted that ‘it would be difficult to duplicate Ditchley in America… We have none of the butlers here.’

As with the 1970s, several Ditchley Lecturers of the 1980s struck a note of necessary fortitude in the face of geopolitical danger. In Ditchley’s 20th Annual Lecture, in 1983, ‘The Atlantic Alliance: Tasks for Tomorrow,’ President Carter’s former Secretary of State and the chairman of American Ditchley Cyrus Vance, diplomatically chose to recognise the early 1980s as a period of geopolitical ‘transition.’ One key issue was the need for sustainable, long-term policies towards the USSR. In Vance’s view, this necessitated that ‘leadership [in such policies] be shared with America’s key allies.’ Nevertheless, Vance argued that ‘it is no secret that, for several years, there has been less than comity in allied discussions about East-West relations,’ pointing to an ‘accretion of misunderstandings.’ For example, he implicitly criticised the anti-nuclear movement in Western Europe and noted that few NATO powers met the goal of 3% per annum real growth in defence spending. Indeed, Vance argued that in times of economic difficulties- ‘no allied nation- including the United States- can go it alone in its defense planning, policies, and procurement… the forces of all must be welded together into an effective allied military structure.’

Parallelly, Vance also recognised that ‘the Western alliance is facing an economic test that has no parallel since the Second World War.’ Amidst mass unemployment, structural transformation, and growing pressures for trade protectionism in developed economies, Vance argued that ‘all must have confidence that the burden is being shared fairly, that all industrialized democracies are moving in directions that can restore mutual benefits instead of further stimulating corrosive competition.’ This example epitomised Vance’s underlying message: the United States was no longer preeminent enough to be able to resolve any issue independently or in isolation. Indeed, past policymakers had ‘erroneously assumed that the basic purposes of Western association would pass automatically to a new generation that did not experience the Great Depression, the Second World War, or the Soviet challenges of the 1940s and 1950s.’ Instead, the Atlantic Alliance had to ‘keep pace with the times, growing and adapting to new forces and factors.’ Whilst its ‘basic principles’ were ‘sound’ they could only remain indispensable were policymakers to ‘express them in ways that make sense for the 1980s.’

The President of Yale University and scholar of legal history Benno C. Schmidt Jr. offered an appropriate commentator for 1987’s Bicentennial of the American Constitution. Much like Vance, Schmidt focused on the tension between change and continuity within America, particularly with regards to domestic politics. Taking his argument from the British historian Thomas Babington Macauley’s declaration that America’s Constitution was ‘all sail and no anchor,’ Schmidt pointed to ‘evidence of growing friction and irresponsibility’ within American politics. This was demonstrated by ‘the pattern of Congressional-Executive stalemate, the obsessive preoccupation with electoral politics, the tendency of the political institutions to evade responsibility by looking to the Supreme Court, the growing politicization of judicial appointments.’ Schmidt primarily sought to highlight the ‘critical common ground’ between America’s constitution and British common law—the elementary principle of government according to law. In Schmidt’s reading, a long tradition of colonial law in the Thirteen Colonies and the influential arguments of the Elizabethan jurist Sir Edward Coke ensured that America’s Revolution was ‘fuelled to a considerable extent by the perception that it was an effort to assert and protect the pre-existing legal rights the colonists thought they should have enjoyed under the British Constitution.’

Schmidt’s Constitution nonetheless remained a living organism. In his view the 1787 Constitution was intentionally vague, designed ‘to invite rhetorical commitment without straying into the bog of controversy about precise meaning.’ This was a decidedly non-originalist interpretation of the Constitution, Schmidt suggesting that legal principles only found their meaning ‘through the thicket of life and not by a grid superimposed on experience.’ Contrary to a groundswell of jurists attempting to faithfully recover or restore the framer’s original intent within a structurally distinct world, Schmidt held that the framers had bequeathed ‘not so much meaning as the search for meaning.’ History, he argued, ‘steers us to the right questions, but rarely supplies simple answers.’ The task of Bicentennial Americans as inheritors and guardians of the Constitution was ‘not to tear down and start anew, but to shore up, refine, and where necessary reconstruct in harmony with that sense of justice that activates both our constitutional traditions.’

If Schmidt’s lecture provided little respite for those fearing the Anglo-American relationship’s present difficulties, it nonetheless pointed to both nations’ shared democratic experiment. As the USSR collapsed and Western Europe spearheaded further integration within the European Communities, the wisdom supposedly provided by these shared historical experience and values allocated Britain and the U.S. a primary role in what was to be a next decade of exceptional geopolitical change.

# the 1990s- ‘special relationship’ at the ‘end of history’

## the 1990s context

Following the widely-proclaimed ‘end’ of the Cold War in 1989, several Ditchley Annual Lecturers turned to analysing the future of post-Communist Eastern and Central Europe, leaving American foreign policy somewhat underplayed and British foreign policy wholly neglected. Such was to recognise that the founding Cold War imperatives behind post-war Anglo-American diplomacy were now relics of a simpler bygone age before full-throttle economic globalisation; European political and monetary integration; and the rise of India and China. Participants in a 1991 Ditchley Conference on ‘A Re-Definition of American Foreign Policy Priorities’ accordingly found common ground in believing that the Cold War’s end had ‘destroyed the premises on which U.S. foreign policy had been based since the war.’

With regards to the special relationship,’ ‘end of the affair’ predictions consequently reached a historic high. The Anglo-American power asymmetry widened further, tensions over Northern Ireland grew, and foreign policy broadly became less politically salient, or at least considerably more difficult for voters to understand. America’s European interests now owed as much to accelerating the accession of formerly Soviet states of Eastern Europe to the European Union as they did to the geostrategic balance maintained in collaboration with Britain and NATO. With the creation of the EU, the WTO and NAFTA, power increasingly appeared to congregate in a flurry of acronymic regional associations as opposed to direct bilateral ties. In the words of John Dickie’s 1994 tellingly-titled book *Special No More*, ‘when there was no longer a communist threat requiring Britain to be the Alliance standard-bearer in Europe for the Americans, the principal *raison d’être* of that relationship had gone.’

The Cold War had served to clarify, concentrate, and simplify the goals of British and American foreign policy. By contrast, as the historian Sir Michael Howard’s 1993 Annual Lecture ‘Cold War, Chill Peace’ declared, ‘the problems we now face arise not from the threat of foreign conquest or hegemony, but from social dislocation on a vast, indeed a global scale; dislocation arising in part from the social and economic results of the wars themselves, but mainly from long-term secular trends that we cannot control and to which we can only adjust as best we can.’ With unparalleled technological innovations, rapid globalisation, a blossoming new media, the emergence of a ‘third way’ balancing conservatism and liberalism and notable peace agreements with regards to Northern Ireland and Israel-Palestine, the 1990s was a decade which led, however momentarily, to pronounced triumphalist outbursts.

Yet any giddy talk of the ‘end of history’ was tempered as both America and Britain faced an onslaught of international crises, from ethnic cleansing in the Balkans and Rwanda to civil war in Somalia and terrorism on domestic shores in Oklahoma City and Omagh. The absence of a singular external enemy frustrated joint decision-making as more nuanced issues revealed more of the Anglo-American relationship’s nuanced disagreements. Common challenges rarely encouraged an immediate common response, particularly regarding the former Yugoslavia. Indeed, the Director’s Note from 1994’s Conference ‘The Future of the North Atlantic Alliance’ warned of the ‘risk that NATO might needlessly talk itself into self-destruction, with lack of confidence or clarity- or premature and excessive expectations in an awkwardly novel world- inserting between its member countries the wedges which Soviet Communist effort had so signally failed to drive.’ The mood at Ditchley was consequently persistently pragmatic, if not entirely pessimistic. As Sir Michael Howard warned by reference to Communism’s rise after the victory against fascism in WWII, ‘the failure of rival creeds does not mean that our own is bound to succeed; only that it has been given another chance.’

## the 1990s at Ditchley

Ditchley discussions concerning America’s global role in the 1990s thus predominantly discussed how it could ‘win the peace.’ Two years before Howard’s sobering reflections, the 49th Speaker of the U.S. House of Representatives and the Democratic Representative for Washington’s fifth district Thomas S. Foley’s 1991 Annual Lecture previewed ‘American Policies and Politics in the 1990s.’ Foley noted that ‘from the end of President Bush’s first year in office, until very recently, no discussion of U.S. policy, particularly foreign policy, could be started except with the sort of phrase, “Isn’t it amazing how far we’ve come?” The Berlin Wall had fallen; Germany had been reunified; Czechoslovakia, Hungary, East Germany, and Albania had all transitioned from Communist governments; and the Warsaw Pact had been dissolved, all with ‘blinding speed.’ Furthermore, America’s relatively unanimous entrance into the Gulf War, with the support of Congress, ‘turned around a long period of growing pessimism in the U.S. public about the effectiveness of their government.’

Nevertheless, Foley argued that many Americans believed that they were not sufficiently addressing domestic issues including homeownership, secondary education, national infrastructure, crime, and poverty. Indeed, Foley further warned that voters seeking to turn the ‘peace dividend’ towards tackling such issues wilfully forsook America’s global responsibilities. Future political leaders had to ‘go about the business very promptly of explaining the importance of a continued U.S. role in Europe and a continued U.S. leadership responsibility around the world.’ Cooperation from America’s allies including Britain would strengthen this effort. Indeed, Foley evoked the Anglo-American relationship extensively, suggesting that it ‘may be more important in the coming months and years that that relationship remains strong, and consciously so on both sides of the Atlantic, as it ever has been, perhaps since the late days of the 1930s.’ Britain’s presence in the European Community, for example, could offer an ‘assurance to many Americans that Europe will not become an instrument of opposition and distance from the United States.’ Whilst the decline of Cold War rigidities and fixations created a more complex international environment, Foley thus concluded that ‘both in Britain and the United States, I think, we can recognise that freedom has had its price and that both countries, with our partners in the alliance, paid a very heavy and important price. But we can be very proud of the result and, I hope, confident of the future.’

This Anglo-American ‘guided’ multilateralism was one of the principal promises of the post-Cold War era celebrated at Ditchley. This opportunity was particularly apparent in the American Ambassador to the UN William Richardson’s 1997 Annual Lecture ‘The United Nations, Regionalism and the Future of International Peace and Security.’ This argued that ‘opportunities for cooperation, both bilaterally and in the United Nations, are greater than ever.’ Richardson noted that NATO’s expansion to Poland, Hungary and the Czech Republic already signalled American attempts to reform and strengthen it. Indeed, this was symptomatic of a ‘critically important change in the international system- the movement toward greater regional cooperation.’ With the decline of a bipolar world, leaders realised that their security and economic stability were inseparable from that of their neighbours. Post-war Europe’s stability, particularly now within the rebranded European Union, provided the ultimate indication that such regional institutions were ‘one of the strongest deterrents to inter and even intra-state conflict in the post-Cold War Era.’ They more realistically allocated peacekeeping and security functions in an equitable manner necessary for a more complex, multipolar twenty-first-century. Implicitly, the message was that weaker ‘second-order’ powers, Britain included, retained no global role if acting alone. Growing interdependence, the erosion of national power and international flows of people, information and capital all frustrated the agenda-setting of singular nation-states. Richardson consequently concluded by encouraging nations to ‘set more realistic expectations… and if you do set such expectations-make them count.’

# the 2000s - the ‘new unilateralism’ and the old multilateralism

## the 2000s context

The 2000s provided Richardson’s hopes for multilateralism a sobering reality check. In fact, the defining debate of Anglo-American relations in the 2000s was the nature and efficiency of diplomatic linkages, broadly defined. If the 1990s had demonstrated that America (yet alone Britain) could no longer go it alone, the 2000s demonstrated that a rigid bilateral partnership between the two powers consequently increasingly appeared naively old-fashioned. Undoubtedly, Tony Blair’s endorsing of U.S. bombings of Afghanistan and Sudan in 1998 and his immediate commitment to military strikes against Saddam Hussein’s Iraq in December 1998 marked a notable degree of agreement. In 2002, Gallup surveys found that 90% of Americans held favourable opinions of the United Kingdom, the highest of any of America’s allies. Yet British ‘pro-American’ actions often went against European wishes, such that a Ditchley Conference of 2001 even asked if ‘parochial’ Europeans could ever be ‘effective partners for the “global” minded Americans.’ Indeed, the 2000s dramatically demonstrated the difficulties of all Britain and America’s alternative alliances. Ultimately, neither Britain nor America consistently possessed the stable relationship with Europe requisite to achieve Richardson’s goal of Britain being America’s pivot in Europe. In fact, what many Europeans perceived to be a brash American unilateralism in the aftermath of 9/11 placed Britain in an exceedingly difficult position by association, divided between two loyalties, two continents and two increasingly conflicting conceptions of its own identity.

This limbo also reflected larger uncertainties concerning national governments’ remaining capacities to carry out or even establish comprehensive foreign policy doctrines. As Conferences Notes from May 1999’s conference ‘Shaping U.S. Foreign Policy’ observed, ‘the growth in interdependence, the erosion of sovereign power, the worldwide flood of information all reduced the ability of national governments to frame their objectives simply and autonomously and to pursue them with tidy consistency.’ Correspondingly, national leaders faced greater difficulties in summoning a national unity of purpose. By 2008, Notes from a conference on ‘The Priorities for U.S. Foreign Policy after George W Bush’ observed that American policy had been ‘consumed by crisis issues,’ with the Anglo-American alliance becoming ‘scratchy and antagonistic.’ After mass protests greeted the WTO Conference in Seattle, Washington in 1999 it was also resoundingly clear that globalisation was producing both a ‘distinctive international culture whose political effect was not yet clear’ and an anti-globalist backlash which was a ‘feature of most major international meetings’ and triggered anti-Americanism as a ‘by-product.’ Globalisation called for new modes of conflict resolution, for new modes of political power. Yet whilst all that was solid melted into air, British and American troops only became further entrenched in a ‘forever’ war in the Middle East which, critics charged, diluted a marriage of values within a marriage of convenience.

## the 2000s at Ditchley

In his Annual Lecture of 2004, ‘America and Europe: What is the Role of Soft Power?’, the political scientist Joseph Nye argued that European faith in the Bush administration had been challenged by America’s ‘new unilateralism’- the advocacy for ‘an assertive approach to promoting American values and policies’ in which American intentions were assumed to be innately good and American hegemony innately benevolent. This appeared arrogant, particularly in the Islamic world and Europe. Nye cited a poll of 2003 claiming that most Europeans viewed the U.S. as a ‘threat to world peace comparable to North Korea or Iran.’ In short, America after the Iraq War was more feared and less loved. Whilst Europeans subconsciously consumed its cultural products and goods, they were warier of importing its customs and values. To recover its soft power, Nye argued, America had to recover its core liberal democratic principles. Ultimately, combating international terrorism or steering the entry of a reformed Russia and emergent China into the international order required Americans to work in tandem with Europe—Nye even suggested that ‘Europe's soft power and America's hard power can combine in a good cop - bad cop routine.’ An America dealing with issues as diverse and wide-ranging as international financial stability, drug trafficking, international terrorism and infectious diseases could simply no longer ‘go it alone.’ To balance soft and hard power, to be *both* feared andloved, was the mark of a smart power.

If the Anglo-American relationship was reduced to a background hum in such speeches, Lord Patten’s 2005 Annual Lecture ‘Britain’s Role: Has Dean Acheson’s Question been Answered Yet?’ brought it front and centre, commencing by repeating Acheson’s 1962 remark that Britain had ‘lost an empire, but not found a role.’ ‘The die was pretty well cast,’ Patten commented of Acheson’s infamous remarks, ‘economic performance had prescribed the limits of resolution and will.’ Nevertheless, most British Prime Ministers still believed that they could be ‘senior prefects in Washington’ and ‘late entrants into the improbably successful Common Market.’ Indeed, America had eagerly accelerated the political integration of Europe and encouraged Britain’s participation in this effort—only de Gaulle’s infamous 1967 ‘non’ to British entrance into the EEC had frustrated this joint interest, producing Britain’s past ‘forty years of geostrategic schizophrenia.’ Patten further underlined the Anglo-American relationship’s asymmetry, claiming that there was little evidence that ‘on the American side mush ever overcomes national interest.’ There were further differences: American nationalism was ‘far more assertive’ and suffused with religiosity, America had ‘degrees of social inequality that would be politically intolerable here,’ and the roots of the American populace itself were changing with increasing hemispheric migration from the Hispanic South.

Patten had no doubts that both nations’ future directions were more complex, the ‘previous certainties on both western and eastern Atlantic shores… less clear and less secure.’ Nor was he positive in evaluating both nations’ recent courses, implicitly criticising a new wave of American neo-conservative foreign policy makers and the ‘preventive wars, the setting aside of the international rule of law and the demonising of the UN and international cooperation’ in Iraq. Britain and America instead had to collaborate on old issues-easing nuclear proliferation- and new ones- constructively engaging China and India and grappling with climate change. The latter was an evident sticking point: America’s refusal to sign the Kyoto Protocol was ‘selfish…foolish…self-destructive.’ American intransigence was symptomatic of larger doubts concerning international institutions, particularly an EU which had shared sovereignty without a ‘European demos to give the sense and confidence that the institutions themselves are accountable.’ In Patten’s view, Europeans had to question the social model which sought to guarantee jobs and created unemployment; to lower barriers to trade with Asia; to invest more in research; to pay more towards joint security; and to expand further- to Turkey, Moldova, and Ukraine. In fostering these tangible improvements, it was ultimately better for Britain to act as a ‘leader in Europe’ rather than as a ‘subaltern in Washington.’ Acheson, in short, was right.

As for America, in 2007 George H.W. Bush’s former National Security Advisor Brent Scowcroft provided an effective summary of the last two decades of Ditchley discussions, building upon Nye’s criticism of American unilateralism. Echoing Howard’s speech some 14 years earlier, Scowcroft’s lecture ‘The Challenges of a Dynamically Changing World’ noted that America was now ‘on centre stage by ourselves’ but faced ‘a hundred, a thousand little problems.’ Of particular concern were internal wars in the Middle East, the ‘fighting house to house in the grubbiest, dirtiest, most fundamental kind of conflict.’ This was a natural consequence of American hubris: what Scowcroft called foreign policy ‘transformationalists’ had attempted to act beyond the conventional parameters of the post-war order in responding to 9/11 and wrongly encouraged ‘implanting democracy with the sword.’ Unfortunately, Scowcroft argued that ‘the stability in the Middle East… has been replaced by chaos rather than democracy… all the many separate problems of that difficult region… have been driven together and exacerbated.’ More corrosively, this ensured that America was ‘no longer getting the benefit of the doubt’ in either Europe or London.

Accordingly, Scowcroft recommended a ‘reinvigoration’ of the Atlantic Community, noting issues with NATO, the UN, the IMF, and the World Bank. The Atlantic Community had to encourage both China and a Russia which was ‘searching for its soul’ to become ‘responsible stakeholder[s] in the world.’ Of course, in recommending these policies Scowcroft appeared almost transformationalist, calling for structural reforms to several critical post-war international institutions. As an extended passage in the middle of Scowcroft’s speech claimed, this was to recognise that:

‘All of this results in a very chaotic world; difficult to predict, difficult to manage. It is almost as if somebody took the lid off the world at the end of the Cold War and inside is this boiling stew. Furthermore, we are trying to cope with this world with habits of mind and institutions which were formed for the Cold War. The Cold War was all-consuming for most of us. It pervaded our lives. We built our institutions to cope with it. We built our processes to cope with it. Now it’s gone, but not the structures and thought processes.’

# the 2010s - globalism challenged

## the 2010s context

In 2010, the British historian and frequent prophet of the special relationship’s imminent demise Alex Danchev observed that ‘without reciprocity, the special relationship is a thing of rags and tatters, a facsimile of its former self, a performance, increasingly hollow.’ Danchev compared Britain to Macbeth’s poor player, ‘that struts and frets his hour upon the stage, And then is heard no more: it is a tale told by an idiot, full of sound and fury, Signifying nothing.’ That year, a landmark House of Commons Foreign Affairs Committee report too advised that the special relationship was ‘potentially misleading’ and recommended that the term’s use should be avoided.

For their part, the British public appeared increasingly sceptical. As the historian Steve Marsh notes, a YouGov poll of May 2010 found that 85% of respondents believed that the UK had little or no influence on American policies, 62% that America failed to consider British interests, and 74% that Britain’s relationship with America had levelled out or declined during Obama’s Presidency. Still, joint necessities compelled a British support for America’s international endeavours described by William Hague as ‘solid not slavish.’ As the Chilcott Inquiry gathered pace, the aftermath of the Iraq War simultaneously alienated British public opinion and compelled a reluctant Britain into interventions in the Middle East alongside America. As Henry Kissinger announced in a 2016 Ditchley Conference, the Middle East had become ‘a mess that the United States had elected to make and then left unresolved on Europe's doorstep.’

Whilst Barack Obama had praised Gordon Brown’s leadership during the late 2000s economic crisis, their relations were never particularly close, with American opinion antagonised by BP’s Deepwater Horizon Spill of 2010 and the Scottish Government’s decision to release the Lockerbie bomber Abdelbaset al-Megrahi on compassionate grounds in August 2009. Obama’s Presidency also witnessed the most explicit hitherto recognition that the Pacific Rim, not Europe, would become the 21st-century’s key geostrategic zone. Following severe damage to Western economies after the Great Recession, this ‘pivot to Asia’ reflected broader shifts in the centres of geopolitical gravity substantially accelerated by globalisation and changing conceptions of America’s own national identity.

Ditchley Notes from 2014’s conference ‘The Global Role of the United States’ suggested that following ‘long, difficult, expensive and unrewarding adventures in Iraq and Afghanistan…public opinion surveys tended to suggest that a majority was fed up with playing the global policeman, for little or no reward, and would prefer a less forward American approach.’ The perception of American decline was ‘still out there, particularly in Asia, and was influencing the attitudes and policies of others.’ Even within Europe, there was much to suggest that Obama’s chosen local trouble-shooter following Russian aggression in Ukraine and the operation to remove Libya’s Colonel Gaddafi was Angela Merkel, not a ‘distracted’ David Cameron. Most prominently, several British commentators struggled to find the least insidious way of implying that America’s first African American President naturally possessed fewer ‘emotional’ ties to Britain, an argument that reached fever pitch after Obama prominently and controversially endorsed Remain in the 2016 Brexit Referendum.

## the 2010s at Ditchley

During the 2010s, American speakers at Ditchley often gave a dutiful nod to the special relationship but were increasingly preoccupied with domestic or structural concerns—the efficiency of America’s domestic institutions; the promise, value, and difficulties of globalism; and the underlying stability of representative democracy. As Obama informed Parliament in 2011, ‘the days are gone when Roosevelt and Churchill could sit in a room and solve the world's problems over a glass of brandy.’ Even for its British cheerleaders, Anglo-American cooperation offered a critical road to dialogue but rarely the ultimate solution. David Miliband’s 2013 Ditchley Annual Lecture observed, for example, that ‘when the transatlantic partnership… is not setting a global agenda, whether on security or climate change or development or financial stability or human rights, then too often there simply isn’t a global agenda at all.’

The only Annual Lecture of the 2010s exclusively dedicated to America was delivered by the President of the D.C-based think tank The Brookings Institution Strobe Talbott in 2010, ‘Obama, America and the World: A Promise at Risk.’ Talbott highlighted that Obama was a self-declared ‘citizen of the world,’ the son of a Kenyan who came to America on a scholarship and met his wife, an anthropologist specialising in Indonesia, at a Russian-language class in Hawai’i. He consequently represented a new globalised America in microcosm. Obama, Talbott noted, consistently talked of ‘strengthening our common security by investing in our common humanity,’ of ‘reaffirming America’s role as a designer and builder of global and regional cooperative structures to buttress international peace and prosperity.’ Yet whilst the present peace between major states represented a historical high watermark, Obama still inherited an ‘in-Box from Hell,’ being confronted with a ‘disaster’ in Afghanistan; ‘dangerous dilemmas’ in Iran and North Korea; global economic collapse; and a ‘moribund’ Middle East peace process. Simply put, ‘none of Obama’s 43 predecessors came into office facing a welter of comparably tough global problems of this multitude, magnitude, urgency, complexity—and consequence.’

Obama, Talbott continued, was helped by neither a growing national debt nor a domestic politics of ‘gridlock, partisan warfare, entrenched special interests’, issues that all produced ‘a combination of disaffection, frustration and often anger at the man who promised to be the change-agent-in-chief.’ Indeed, Talbott identified Washington’s ‘single most consequential drama’ as Obama’s frustrated attempts to set CO2 emission targets. Talbott warned that unless the U.S. wholeheartedly committed to action there would not be sufficient traction to curb global emissions in the timeframe needed to prevent pernicious effects on the climate. In combination with the ongoing issue of nuclear proliferation, all this was to present a ‘test of the idea and institution of democratic governance itself.’ Talbott even warned of a ‘cruel, even fatal irony’ were democracy ‘to empower the tyranny of short-term and short-sighted expedients over long-term imperatives relating to the survival of the human enterprise.’

Born into a military family in Aurora, Colorado in 1943, John Kerry was a prominent anti-war veteran during the Vietnam War before moving into Massachusetts state politics. Educated at St Paul’s and Yale, his was a privileged upbringing, dating JFK’s half-sister and sailing with JFK himself. From a young age, Kerry’s high ambitions were poorly disguised: as a schoolchild, his classmates used to greet him by playing ‘Hail to the Chief’ on the kazoo.

Kerry rose to fame after receiving three Purple Heart Medals, a Bronze Star, and a Silver Star after a four-month tour of South Vietnam from 1968 to 1969. He soon became a spokesman for the Vietnam Veterans Against the War, testifying before the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations in 1971.

Following stints at a radio talk show, Kerry moved into law before being elected to the U.S. Senate for Massachusetts in 1984. In the Senate, he spearheaded campaign finance reform and was a prominent member of the Foreign Relations Committee, working alongside Senator John McCain on recovering details about American MIAs and normalising diplomatic relations with Vietnam. Most famously, Kerry ran as the Democratic Candidate for the Presidency in 2004, making him the last Democratic candidate to lose the popular vote.

In 2013, Kerry became the 68th U.S. Secretary of State under Barack Obama and most prominently served as the chief negotiator in nuclear talks with Iran. Despite anticipating his retirement and declaring in 2013 that ‘I have fourteen months left on the clock,’ Kerry founded the Climate Change organisation World War Zero in 2019 before becoming the first US Special Presidential Envoy for Climate under President Biden this January.

john kerry, 1943-

In 2014, the Canadian broadcaster, historian and former Liberal Party Leader Michael Ignatieff’s Annual Lecture ‘The Post-Ukraine World Order’ also warned of democracy’s declining global power. Ignatieff observed that ‘we sense that these changes – in Europe, the Middle East and East Asia – are connected to each other. We sense that the tectonic plates are shifting. We question whether anyone in Washington, London, Moscow or Beijing truly grasps what is going on.’ Borrowing a phrase from Lawrence Summers, Ignatieff pointed to the rise of a new ‘mercantilist authoritarianism,’ particularly in Russia and China, warning that they ‘cannot be changed, but they can be contained and they can be waited out.’ America had to work towards offering both China and Russia alternative relationships to further integration with one other, to provide ‘credible deterrence by land, sea and air to any authoritarian threat to the territorial integrity of allied states from the Baltic to the China Sea.’

This, however, would never be enough, Ignatieff arguing that ‘the battle of ideas needs to be won, not on the high seas of East Asia, the desert borderlands of Iraq and Syria, or the bloodlands of Ukraine. The real battle lies at home.’ The ‘real problem,’ that which alarmed American allies, was ‘democratic dysfunction at home: the 20-year impasse between Congress and the executive branch, the reality-fleeing polarization of political argument, the gross failure to control the invidious power of money in politics, weakening domestic infrastructure and public disillusion with democracy itself.’ The ‘broadly-based public faith in American institutions and American equality’ had been ‘sapped by fifty years of ill-conceived adventures abroad.’ Indeed, one year later Pew Research found that only 19% of Americans trusted the government to do what was right. In fact, since July 2007 the percentage declaring this had never exceeded 30%, creating the ‘longest period of low trust in government in more than 50 years.’ In concluding, Ignatieff warned Americans that ‘we do not need further foolish adventures abroad, still less words that are not backed up with deeds. We need a Europe and a United States whose people believe, once again, in their own institutions and relish the chance to prove, in peaceful competition, that they can meet the challenge of the new authoritarianism.’

The most recent Ditchley Annual Lecture held by an American was that of Obama’s Secretary of State John Kerry on 8th July 2017, ‘Globalism Strikes Back.’ Like Ignatieff, Kerry invoked the lessons of the 20th-century in decrying nationalism and neo-populism, urging listeners to not take the current world order established by Anglo-American cooperation during WWII for granted. Kerry noted that the Anglo-American relationship was ‘really unlike any other in the world…for the size of economies and size of the influence of our nations. And it has endured, in fact emerged even stronger over the years.’ Kerry particularly praised Churchill and FDR for making ‘decisions based not on their own ideology, but on what they knew was needed in such a dark time.’

This stood in ‘stark contrast to the haphazard, helter-skelter of today's tweets and insults.’ Contemporary leaders were ‘publicly walking on eggshells, feigning oblivion to the obvious, pretending not to see all the indicators that scream for a change of course.’ In short, 2017 was an equally dangerous moment. The irony was that because democracy was predominant voters had ‘lost the tragic awareness of peace’s fragility – the awareness that I think we here feel so personally.’ It was only at such moments, when the transatlantic relationship became strained, that ‘we found we needed each other.’

The discontent was chiefly domestic. Noted Kerry, ‘we've never experienced so many simultaneous tugs at the fabric of everyday life. For many, there is a natural rebellion, a sense of helplessness – a sense that one just doesn't know how to keep up. For others, there’s a retreat into false perceptions of greater comfort and security in the past.’ The result was a ‘massive erosion of institutional legitimacy’ and a decline in ‘true civil discourse- the very heartbeat of democracy.’

Like Talbott, Kerry positioned climate change at the leading edge of global problem-solving. President Trump’s withdrawal from the Paris Agreement was ‘an unprecedented forfeiture of American leadership’ and would result in lost influence and ‘lost momentum which everyone may come to regret, if the world doesn't press forward faster.’ It was a ‘global stain on our credibility and unbecoming of an office as important as [the] President,’ Kerry warning that ‘I do not know for certain if we will get there in time. And that should motivate every single one of you.’ In concluding, however, Kerry recounted his experiences of the Holocaust, Cold War, and Yugoslav Wars, maintaining that:

‘We found our way through each of these challenges, and we did it together. The transatlantic bond has endured not because we have somehow been immune to tragedy and strife. We are strong because we are resilient; because we made it through these difficulties; because in decade after decade we have stood together to defend a set of values – security and our prosperity came out of those values being applied in the choices we made. We have resisted attempt after attempt to divide us; and above all, we are strong because of the core beliefs that keep us together.’

In words echoing Hodson’s of 1962, this was to finally maintain that the transatlantic partnership was ‘not a trophy from the past that we can put on a mantle in a beautiful home and admire once a year – it is a living, breathing, multi-faceted endeavour. We have to renew it with each generation and refuel every day with our energy, our ideas, our resources, and – above all – with our collective determination.’

# Conclusion

Kerry’s ‘living, breathing, multi-faceted endeavour’ usefully summarises the past fifty-nine years of Ditchley discussions concerning the ‘special relationship.’ From 1962 to 2021, Ditchley participants have emphasised the instability, fragility, and adaptability of the Anglo-American relationship, understanding it as a diplomatic tie to not think *of,* but *with.* This has been particularly marked recently amidst broader doubts concerning the appeal of ‘western’ representative democracy. As the Director’s Notes from Ditchley’s September 2020 conference ‘The U.S. and the UK: A Special Relationship for the 21st-Century’ recognised, ‘for many in this discussion, the last two decades had seen a fall from grace: a descent from what many regarded as a highpoint in the late 1990s, when liberal democracy was riding high, before the 9/11 terror attacks, the Iraq War, the financial crisis, Brexit, the election of President Trump and the outbreak of the global Covid-19 pandemic. The international standing, influence and capability of the UK was also seen as reduced.’

The following year has, if anything, only exacerbated this impression. During this January’s G7 summit in Cornwall, an *Atlantic* editorial claimed that Boris Johnson perceived the phrase ‘special relationship’ to appear ‘needy and weak,’ mere days after President Biden launched his G7 attendance with a *Washington Post* editorial noting his intent to ‘affirm the special relationship.’ The political consultants Redfield & Wilton Strategies found that 49% of Britons agreed with Johnson’s criticism of the term when prompted with his comment and that 50% believed the United States to have ‘too much influence in the United Kingdom.’ In the final days of writing this piece, the fall of Kabul starkly questioned the stability or even continued existence of the American world order, ultimately revealing Britain’s inability to prevent the rapid collapse of what has slowly and surely become an American-dominated undertaking.

As participants in September 2020’s conference recognised then, the ‘special relationship’ now resembles a ‘four-dimensional puzzle’ complicated by both the immediate matters of the Brexit transition and larger questions concerning an increasingly ill-defined ‘Western’ bloc’s global role, power, and priorities. The Anglo-American alliance, in short, is never emancipated from the issues of the moment. Instead, it frequently reformulated its meaning through its improvised responses to such challenges. From its founding, Ditchley participants have consequently emphasised that the Anglo-American relationship cannot be presumed to be timeless and innate, nor can it be studied with sole regard for one particular facet of the relationship or in isolation from the other diplomatic ties, European or hemispheric, which both nations struggle to balance.

The Anglo-American ties celebrated at Ditchley were rooted in three essential dynamics. First, the belief expressed by Alec Douglas-Home, General Lauris Norstad and Arnold Heeney that the trans-Atlantic alliance offered Britain the military, economic and diplomatic support necessary to stage the strongest defence against Soviet aggression in Europe. Second, the British recognition from H.V. Hodson to David Miliband that it could no longer unilaterally protect its interests given its declining global status and that America, of all nations, most closely shared its beliefs as to how the world *ought* to be. As the celebrated journalist Edward Murrow declared during the 1963 conference ‘The British and American Past, and the Atlantic Future,’ this alignment of values was ultimately rooted in ‘a longing to live in the same kind of world.’ Finally, Ditchley discussions continually reflected the belief, arising from persistent suspicion regarding European political integration, that Anglo-American cultural, ideological, and historic ties created a natural, implicit and unrivalled trust. The two powers could consequently present a shared front that could tacitly influence European decision-makers and steer global decision-making.

As for the special relationship’s sceptics, Ditchley Annual Lecturers ranging from McGeorge Bundy in 1969 to Cyrus Vance in 1983 have argued that a declining Britain rarely contributed equitably to shared military efforts, whether in Vietnam or Afghanistan. Conversely, many have argued that American hubris- from Joseph Nye’s ‘new unilateralism’ to Brent Scowcroft’s ‘transformationalists’-alienated British and European allies, particularly following the Iraq War. This argument has frequently complemented the contention that the USSR’s collapse erased the post-war Anglo-American relationship’s very founding *raison d’être.* Recent American lecturers including William Richardson, Brent Scowcroft, Strobe Talbott and John Kerry have all consequently understood the Anglo-American relationship as merely one legacy of a post-WWII international order, itself exemplified by Ditchley, that needs to be adjusted to our more complex multipolar world. Particularly within the last two decades, this also reflected participants’ recognition that China and India’s rise pushed the centre of geopolitical gravity ever-the-more away from the Atlantic and towards the Asia-Pacific.

Indeed, Ditchley discussants have consistently understood the Anglo-American relationship as one key pivot within larger multilateral ties including the ‘Anglosphere,’ the ‘Atlantic Alliance’ or simply ‘The West.’ Particularly in Ditchley’s first decades, Commonwealth lecturers including Canada’s Arnold Heeney continually called to expand the ‘special relationship’ to the wider Anglosphere. Equally, in recent decades British speakers including Lord Patten and David Miliband have reframed the Anglo-American relationship as a critical lever for spurring international cooperation in tackling global issues including nuclear proliferation and climate change, particularly via the European Union.Ditchley Lectures have also consistently intertwined the domestic and the international—McGeorge Bundy in 1969, Barbara Jordan in 1976 and Thomas Foley in 1991 have all argued that domestic protest, economic instability, America’s periodic isolationist tendencies, and generational changes have threatened the special relationship. Finally, a consistent realist streak, including H.V. Hodson in 1962, Alec Douglas-Home in 1968 and Lord Patten in 2005, has argued that the special relationship has frequently been more rooted in sentiment than in a consistent conjunction of tangible interests, or that power asymmetries have ultimately rendered it more important for London than Washington.

Ultimately, whilst many Ditchley Lecturers have followed Hodson in consciously adopting a dispassionate, pragmatic or ‘anatomist’-esque mode of analysis, few have doubted the Anglo-American connection’s basic symbolic appeal or denied its importance altogether. Geopolitical realism represents the point of departure but rarely the final horizon. Nor have Ditchley’s storied Anglo-American roots quietened trenchant criticism of this relationship. Consequently, whilst Ditchley’s Annual Lecturers increasingly look towards more diverse and wide-ranging subject matters and geographic frames of reference, no single topic has been the subject of more Annual Lectures and the most frequent nationality of Ditchley’s Annual Lecturers remains an appropriately shared Anglo-American first place.

If anything, Ditchley’s many recent conferences on President Trump’s America reveal that Anglo-American ties are critical enough to be discussed with a necessarily frank sincerity, ‘thinking new things and making new connections’ in the best of the Ditchley spirit. From educational exchanges to cultural interchanges, much of the Anglo-American relationship’s deeper undercurrents survive stubbornly regardless of contemporary politics’s present whims. We might ultimately echo Schmidt in asserting that this underlying history of Anglo-American ties steers us to the right questions but rarely supplies simple answers.

In short, despite some of the most consequential sixty-some years in geopolitical history, America remains the most influential of all Britain’s possible allies. This is principally because the Anglo-American alliance has always attempted to evolve to meet its epoch, creating a process of constant reformulation uniquely visible within Ditchley’s archives. The Anglo-American connection’s stubborn persistence has consequently created, for better or for worse, a ‘living, breathing, multi-faceted’ allegiance that Ditchley participants have always maintained remains worth defending. To recognise this, one only needs to imagine how different Britain’s twentieth-century would be without it. After all, as H.V. Hodson recognised at Ditchley’s first event some fifty-nine years ago, ‘like the air we breathe or the pulses of our hearts, these relations we are apt to ignore until something goes wrong, the air is fouled or a cardiac spasm seizes us, when at once we realise how our life depends on them.’

# timeline

**World Events/ Events at Ditchley**

**1933**- The Anglo-American MP Ronald Tree purchases Ditchley.

**June 1940**- Following the fall of France, FDR provides extensive economic aid and armaments to Britain.

**9th November 1940**- Churchill first visits Ditchley.

**1941**- UK and U.S. sign Atlantic Charter.

**11th March 1941**- Lend-Lease Enacted.

**7th December 1941**- Attack on Pearl Harbor Sees America Enter WWII.

**16th February 1944**- Churchill First Uses the Term ‘Special Relationship.’

**5th March 1946**- In Fulton, Missouri, Churchill notes the formation of the ‘Iron Curtain’ and extends the ‘special relationship’ to the U.S. and British Empire.

**July 1948**- First American deployment in Britain, of B-29 Bombers.

**1948-1951**- Marshall Plan provides $3.3 billion towards modernizing British Infrastructure.

**4th April 1949**- Formation of NATO.

**1950-1953**- Under a UN Mandate, British and American troops fight in the Korean War.

**1953**- Sir David Wills purchases Ditchley.

**1956**- Suez Crisis.

**1957**- Treaty of Rome forms the European Economic Community.

**1958**-The Ditchley Foundation founded as a privately funded charity/ 1958- US-UK Mutual Defense Agreement work towards developing Britain’s nuclear arsenal.

**May 1960**- American shooting down of a U.S. U-2 spy plane during 1960’s Paris Summit frustrate MacMillan’s attempts at détente with the USSR.

1962- JFK cancels the joint project ‘Skybolt,’ a nuclear air-to-ground missile.

**27th April 1962**- Annual Lecture I- The Anatomy of Anglo-American Relations, delivered by Mr H.V. Hodson, Provost of Ditchley, formerly Editor, The Sunday Times.

**June 1962**- British and America in Tropical Africa.

**September 1962**- The Impact of European Integration on Commonwealth American Relations.

**December 1962**- Former Secretary of State Dean Acheson declares that ‘Great Britain has lost an empire and has not yet found a role.’ Shortly after, De Gaulle vetoes British entry into the EEC.

**March 1963**- Relevance of American Liberal Arts Colleges to British Higher Education.

**May 1963**- The British and American Past, and the Atlantic Future.

**September 1963**- The Problem of the Nuclear Deterrent in the context of British-American Relations.

**18th October 1963**- Annual Lecture II- The Dimensions of the Atlantic Alliance, delivered by General Lauris Norstad, USAF. Supreme Allied Commander, Europe, and Commander-in-Chief, United States European Command.

**1964-1970**- Harold Wilson consistently refuses to send troops to Vietnam.

**January 1964**- Current Problems Affecting Anglo-American Relations.

**February 1964**- British and American Policies in the Middle East.

**19th June 1964**- Annual Lecture III- Friends and Relations, delivered by Arnold D P Heeney, QC. Chairman, Canadian Section, International Joint Commission (USA and Canada).

**November 1964**- The Teaching of American Studies in Britain.

**January 1965**- British and the United States after the Elections.

**March 1965**- British and American policies towards Southern and Central Africa.

**December 1965**-The United States, British and other Commonwealth Policies in the Caribbean.

**January 1967**- The Future of Europe and the Atlantic Community.

**June 1967**- Paths to an Atlantic Community.

**28th July 1967**- Annual Lecture VI- The English-Speaking Peoples in a Changing World, delivered by The Rt Hon Sir Robert Menzies, KT, CH, QC, Prime Minister of Australia 1939-1941 and 1949-1966.

**19th July 1968**- Annual Lecture VII- An International Weather Forecast, delivered by The Rt Hon Sir Alec Douglas-Home, KT, PC, DL, MP. Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs 1960-1963; Prime Minister and First Lord of the Treasury 1963-1964.

**January 1969**- New Political Ideas and Movements, with particular reference to student and racial unrest.

**March 1969**- The Reform of the Machinery of Government.

**March 1969**- The Future of NATO.

**18th July 1969**- Annual Lecture VIII- The Americans and Europe: Rhetoric and Reality, delivered by The Honorable McGeorge Bundy, President of the Ford Foundation and Special Assistant to the President of the United States for National Security Affairs, 1961-1966.

**December 1969**- Trade Policies in the Atlantic Area, and Financial Policies Affecting Trade.

**1971**- Bermuda communique declares that British entry to the EEC benefitted the Atlantic Alliance.

**1973**- Heath maintains British neutrality in the Yom Kippur War, whilst U.S. failed to inform UK that DEFCON 3 had been reached.

**1st January 1973**- British admission to the European Economic Community.

**21st September 1973**- Annual Lecture XII- Europe and the Americans, delivered by Dr Joseph Luns, GCMG, CH. Secretary General of the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation, Minister of Foreign Affairs, The Netherlands (1952-1971).

**July 1974**- The Meaning and Effects of Détente.

**November 1974**- The Meaning and Effects of Détente.

**February 1975**- The Meaning and Effects of Détente.

**January 1976**- The United States of America in the Last Quarter of the Twentieth Century.

**April 1976**- The Role of the Western Alliance, 1976-1985.

**June 1976**- Britain and America: Problems and Opportunities.

**23rd July 1976**- Annual Lecture XV- America’s Imports Revealed: The Tributaries of American Culture, delivered by Congresswoman Barbara Jordan, Representative for the 18th District of the State of Texas.

**September 1976**- Britain and America: Problems and Opportunities.

**February 1977**- US-European Relations with the Countries of Southern Africa.

**January 1979**- The Western Economies: Changing Attitudes to the Welfare State.

**April 1979-** The Western Economies- Taxation.

**September 1979**- The Western Economies: The Role of Management.

**October 1979**- American Leadership of the Western World.

**April 1980**- NATO: Its Authority and Future.

**May 1980**- The Role of the Dollar as an International Currency.

**November 1980**- The Balance of Power in the Pacific.

**December 1980**- The Strategies of the East and West.

**1981-1989**- Thatcher-Reagan Marks a High Point in Post-War Relations.

**17th July 1981**- The Economic Challenges of the ‘80s

**December 1981**- Western Capitalism and Economic Dimensions of Freedom.

**1982**- U.S. (albeit belatedly) supports British counter-invasion of the Falklands Islands/ Polaris fleet replaced with US-supplied Trident missiles.

**1983**- American Operation Urgent Fury invades Grenada against British wishes.

**March 1983**- The Atlantic Partners: Cooperation and Diversity.

**15th July 1983**-Annual Lecture XX- The Atlantic Alliance: Tasks for Tomorrow, delivered by The Hon Cyrus R Vance, formerly Secretary of the Army, Deputy Secretary of Defense, and Secretary of State of the United States of America.

**September 1983**- Africa in the World Economy.

**April 1984**- Western Defence: Is Existing Strategy Obsolescent.

**June 1984**- 35 Years Since the Marshall Plan.

**September 1984**- The Anglo-American Alliance since 1945: The Transformation of a Wartime Partnership.

**April 1985**- Finance, Trade and Development: Transatlantic Cooperation in Dealing with the World’s Economic Problems.

**May 1985**- The United States, Britain, and Europe: Changed Relationships in a Changing World.

**May 1985**- Exchanges in the Performing Arts between the U.S. and Britain.

**1986**- U.S. bomb Tripoli and Benghazi from RAF stations under Thatcher’s permission.

**September 1986**- The Defence of the West: The Future of NATO in an era of emerging technologies and diverging interests.

**May 1987**- A New Generation, Old Institutions, and a Middle-Aged Alliance: Is There Room for Innovation in Transatlantic Relationships? A Conference for the Successor Generation.

**May 1987**- The Atlantic Gap: National Differences and the Future of the Alliance- Options for Action by the Private Sector.

**17th July 1987**- Annual Lecture XXIV- English Anchor- American Sail: Two Centuries of the American Constitution, delivered by Professor Benno C. Schmidt Jr., President, Yale University.

**May 1988**- The Next American Presidency: Foreign Policy Agenda and Issues.

**October 1988**- The European Pillar of the North Atlantic Alliance: A Security Dimension for the Process of European Integration.

**1989**- George H.W. Bush proposes reduction of U.S. troops in Europe, to the annoyance of Thatcher.

**1991**- Gulf War

**May 1991**- A Re-Definition of American Foreign Policy Priorities, with special reference to Europe.

**5th July 1991**-Annual Lecture XXVIII- After the Persian Gulf: American Politics and Policies in the 1990s, delivered by The Honorable Thomas S Foley, Speaker of the U.S. House of Representatives since 1989, Chairman of the House Democratic Caucus (1976-1980), House Majority Whip (1981-1987) and Majority Leader (1987-1989).

**September 1991**- The Federal State: Lessons from North American and European Experience.

**November 1992**- The U.S. and the European Community.

**1993**- ‘Copenhagen Ambush’ as Clinton and Chancellor Kohl turn the European Community towards relaxing the UN arms embargo on weapons to Bosnia, despite John Major’s wishes.

**1st July 1993**-Annual Lecture XXX- Cold War, Chill Peace, delivered by Professor Sir Michael Howard CBE MC FBA. Lovett Professor of Military and Naval History at Yale University (1989-93), Professor of War Studies, King’s College, University of London (1963-68) and thereafter, at the University of Oxford, a Fellow of All Souls College, Chichele Professor of the History of War (1977-80) and Regius Professor of Modern History (1980-89). A Governor of the Ditchley Foundation.

**November 1994**- The Future of the North Atlantic Alliance.

**1995**- Sinn Féin leader Gerry Adams received at the White House, against British wishes.

**November 1996**- The Evolution of the Trans-Atlantic Partnership.

**June 1997**- After the U.S. and UK Elections: Impacts and Prospects.

**1st July 1997**-Annual Lecture XXXIV- The United Nations, Regionalism and the Future of International Peace and Security, delivered by Ambassador William Richardson, Ambassador and United States Permanent Representative to the United Nations. Formerly Member of the 98th-103rd Congresses from the 3rd District of New Mexico and a Vice Chair of the Democratic National Committee.

**1999**- Tony Blair pushes Bill Clinton towards deploying ground troops in Kosovo.

**May 1999**- Shaping U.S. Foreign Policy Today: National Interest versus Special Interest.

**2001**- Tony Blair promises to stand ‘shoulder to shoulder’ with George W. Bush against terrorism following the September 11 attacks.

**June 2001**- Transatlantic Relations- Cooperation and Competition.

**April 2002**- 11th September 2001: What Long Term Impact?

**February 2003**- The Future Role of NATO.

**2nd July 2004**-Annual Lecture XL- America and Europe: What is the Role of Soft Power?, delivered by The Honorable Joseph Nye, Dean of the Kennedy School at Harvard 1995-2004.

**February 2005**- The U.S. Election: Prospects for the New Administration.

**8th July 2005**- Annual Lecture XLI- Britain’s Role: Has Dean Acheson’s Question been Answered Yet?, delivered by The Rt Hon The Lord Patten of Barnes CH, Chancellor of Oxford and Newcastle Universities.

**6th July 2007**- Annual Lecture XLIII-The Challenges of a Dynamically Changing World, delivered by The Hon Brent Scowcroft, President and Founder Scowcroft Group, Vice Chairman Kissinger Associaties Inc 1982-1989 and Chairman of the Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board 2001-2005.

**Feb 2008**- 50th Anniversary Event: The Priorities for U.S. Foreign Policy after George W. Bush.

**October 2009**- What Next for US-EU Relations?

**10th July 2010**- Annual Lecture XLVI- Obama, America, and the World: A Promise at Risk, delivered by The Honorable Strobe Talbott, President of the Brookings Institution.

**2010**- Hilary Clinton’s support for Argentine negotiations over the Falklands angers Whitehall.

**15th-17th September 2011**- 9/11: The World Ten Years On.

**2013**- UK parliament vote against participating in U.S. military action in Syria.

**19th-21st September 2014**- The Global Role of the United States.

**29th-31st January 2015**- The Future of Democracy in the World: Magna Carta 800th Anniversary.

**16th-18th September 2016**- The U.S. and Europe: Renewing the Transatlantic Partnership.

**16th-18th March 2017**- Which Way is West and is the West still best? What do President Trump, Brexit, and the Technological Revolution Mean for the Future of the West?

**8th July 2017**- Annual Lecture LIII- In Defence of Globalism/Globalisation Strikes Back!, delivered by John F. Kerry, U.S. Secretary of State 2013-2017.

**8th-10th September 2017**- The Future of the Transatlantic Community and the International Order.

**November 2017**- President Trump controversially retweets anti-Muslim posts from the British far-right group Britain First.

**May 2018**- Marriage of Meghan Markle and Prince Harry brings second American into the Royal Family after Wallis Simpson.

**July 2018**- Following domestic pressure, Trump visits U.K. on a downgraded ‘working visit.’

**September 2018**- The Crisis of Democracy in Europe and the United States.

**16th-18th May 2019**- The Rise of Populism: A Crisis of Democracy or Noisy Renewal.

**26th-28th April 2019**- The Trans-Atlantic Community and Global Finance.

**June 2019**- Trump’s official state visit to the UK causes uproar.

**July 2019**- Leak of critical diplomatic cables from Britain’s U.S. ambassador Kim Darroch.

**10-11th September 2020**- The U.S. and the UK: A Special Relationship for the 21st-Century?

**7th November 2020**- Joe Biden wins U.S. election.

**6th January 2021**- Storming of the US Capitol.

**June 2021**- Biden and Johnson meet at the G7 Summit in Cornwall.