**WILEY**

# Democracy through law
# The Transatlantic Reflection Group and its manifesto in defence of democracy and the rule of law in the age of "artificial intelligence"

**Paul Nemitz**[*]

The Transatlantic Reflection Group on Democracy and the Rule of Law in the Age of Artificial Intelligence was a collective exercise. At the outset was a conversation I had with Konstantinos Karachalios, an engineer by profession, working as the director of standardisation at the Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers (IEEE). We go back a long way. Konstantinos takes seriously the motto of the IEEE, 'Advancing Technology for Humanity'. He understands that 'for Humanity' is filled with meaning and refers to a purpose of technology which is neither in the first place oriented towards, nor limited in its purpose to, business objectives.

In late 2020, we started to mull over the idea of bringing together a multidisciplinary group of women and men from both sides of the Atlantic to see how democracy and the rule of law could be invigorated in light of the threats to democracy and law posed by the absence of sufficient regulation of the big digital corporations and their activities, and by powerful new multipurpose technologies like 'artificial intelligence'. The storming of the US Capitol on 6 January 2021 was fresh in our minds when we started calling around and sending invitations to join the group.

In March 2021, we had a first meeting of the group, facilitated by the founder and CEO of the New York Company H5, Nicolas Economou. We met every last Friday of the month, for two hours, over the internet. In between, we worked on a written procedure. Two drafts of the text were the basis of our later consensus, a first produced by me, a second evolution by Marietje Schaake. Both mutations received very detailed oral and written proposals for changes by the members of the group. At the beginning of May, the group agreed to aim for the publication of a final text a few days before the visit of President Biden to Brussels for the EU–US Summit on 14 June. This objective focused minds and increased the intensity of work. The paper was published in time and signed up later by others.

It is documented here, together with a few lines which explain my personal motivation to start this group. This motivation may not be shared by all who participated. But that does not matter. Because that is one of the rules of democracy: we may have very different motivations, we may have very different backgrounds, we may speak different languages. But we can understand each other and eventually agree on matters so important that it

---

matters whether we agree or not. And our motivations to agree may be different. And on many other matters we will never agree and we do not need to agree.

The ability to agree is the scarcest resource in today's polarised societies, much scarcer than the great new startup idea or the great next paper in academia. I am happy that in this group we were able to agree, and thus to show that agreement is possible, across the Atlantic and across disciplines, on a very limited set of issues on which in the last decade agreement often seemed impossible to reach across the Atlantic. In the past, there was only space for token declarations of very high level principles of commonality. But with technology becoming ever more prevalent in our lives and societies, it is increasingly important for democracies to agree on rules for these technologies. In a world of convenient clicking, in which we spend ever more time in a human–machine relationship (as distinct from human–human relationships), it is important that we relearn ever again and practise ever again the understanding among humans, based on language. That is the precondition for peace, for living together and building together, for taking responsibility for the present and future, together, in democratic processes. We need to practise these processes over and over again, as without this practice, we may become dominated by an attention economy built on algorithms and machines, which constitute the new platforms for discourse and for so much more; an attention economy, which rewards the individualistic, eccentric and divisive lonely scream over the calm discourse, which helps people reflect and come together to agree on common rules.

We need to rehabilitate law—for democracy's sake. The crisis of law goes much beyond the present rule of law crisis, which we see in some Members States of the EU, undermining the good functioning of the judiciary. Neoliberal ideology of deregulation for decades has preached a generally negative attitude to law. Law has been described in the first place as an obstacle to freedom, in particular entrepreneurial freedom, to innovation and as a cost factor for business that needs to be avoided or minimised wherever possible. This neoliberal discourse against new law has done great damage to democracy as it has delegitimised the noblest instrument of democracy, which is law.

This has been added to an initially separate tech-driven discourse to delegitimise law, based on John Perry Barlow's Declaration of the Independence of Cyberspace and the California ideology claiming that all the world's problems can be better solved by technology, or within circuits limited to actors of technology, than by democracy. John Perry Barlow explicitly stated that legislators had no legitimacy in cyberspace. Combined in a third step with modern autocratic populism, these two tendencies—neoliberalism and technoabsolutism—have undermined democracy and law to such an extent that Congress was stormed. And nearly also, the Berlin Reichstag.

We cannot maintain a functioning democracy if at the same time we systematically talk down and oppose the most noble instrument by which it expresses itself and shapes society. A State that can no longer shape society through law, a society in which key decisions are left to corporations, to self-regulation, to ethics committees, all to avoid the democractic process of law making and the binding force and enforceability of law, is no longer a democracy. Thus, if we want to maintain democracy, we need to rehabilitate law as its noblest instrument. And we, including within executives and legislatives of democratic societies, must stop spreading the different discourses undermining law as a key instrument of democracy. We must be ready to make binding law and ensure its enforceability, in particular against the most powerful who seek to shape the world according to their own liking and interests. Even if this is an uphill battle.

And we need to rehabilitate human language before the code. A part of the technology discourse puts data and software programs above the law written in human language. The code is posited as the ideal to control the functioning, not only of machines, but of all systems. Societies and humans are described in this logic only as systems that process data, and as failing systems, due to so-called human weaknesses. In this way, legitimacy is sought by equating humans and society with computers, and eventually, by seeking singularity, in which humans merge with technology, and there is no longer any difference between the two worlds. And this end of humanity is advertised as human improvement.

These discourses ignore that our constitutions posit that humans should never become objects of machine control. And that code and software are written for idiots. These idiots are the computers. They cannot think on their own. It is for this reason that optimisation only works via a constant updating and rewriting of the code. That is why every month, we must receive an update on our mobile phones. The facile language of the tech lobby that the law has to be updated as quickly as the code ignores three key differences between code and law: first, the law is not written for idiots, like the code. It is written for humans. And humans are not idiots, like computers. They can think for themselves. Second, law is written in human open language. The two factors, namely that the addressees of the law can think for themselves and that the law is written in human language, not mathematical code, allows the law to stand when change of context occurs or malfunctioning is revealed, while the code needs constant change through updating. Because open human language can be reinterpreted by thinking human beings, to take account of new technologies or business models. And third, the law is made in a democratic process, which by its nature requires deliberation and compromise. No law is or can be perfect. And we cannot want perfect law, neither in its formulation nor in its enforcement. Because that is fascism. Those who require law to be perfect (like code, they say, not realising that code also never is perfect), who send their lobbyists with facile language like 'We'd rather have no law than a bad law', must let themselves be asked whether they are serving antidemocratic tendencies. No law can be perfect for this or that business model, no law can be perfect for this or that technology. And it is antidemocratic to spread the dream of code like perfect law being better than law made in language which humans can understand, and on which they can deliberate and agree by way of compromise, to reach a majority for adoption.

The challenge of the time is to make best use of the openness of language for future reinterpretation, in light of new technologies, new business models and other changes in the world. Humans can think, have an endless capacity for innovation and are able to re-interpret law, if it is technology-neutral, ever anew. This openness of language to the future is its key strength which we realise through technology—neutral law. A law which does not use the tech buzzwords of the time, which is not written by engineers for engineers, but a law which is written in the language of democracy for humans who can understand it and give it ever new meaning through interpretation within its time. The law, debated in democratic fora and the public sphere, using our language, and made with language, its interpretation through science, the legal professions and the judiciary, and its openness to the endless ability of humans to innovate, is the only tool which combines the democratic process and the ability to shape things, and thus to realise self-determination. It has this ability only because our understanding of the world is based on the use of language, and it uses this basic, and essential tool, of human thinking. Let us hold language and law high and let us not create the impression that their position in the thinking of humans and in democracy can be replaced by digital data and code. And let us not create the impression that self-determination ends with programming and downloading the best program to protect our interests. There is no self-determination without human language and making good use of this language through engagement in democracy and shaping the law. And the world continues to be shaped and shall continue to be shaped in this way, and not just by technology. This is what we must aim for if we want to maintain our democracies alive and well.

## A MANIFESTO IN DEFENCE OF DEMOCRACY AND THE RULE OF LAW IN THE AGE OF 'ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE'[1]

Advanced software and cyber-physical systems, so-called 'Artificial Intelligence' (AI) systems, and data-driven business models increasingly govern portions of our lives: they influence how we work, love, buy, sell, communicate, meet and navigate. They impact individual rights, social interactions, the economy and politics. They pose new risks to national security, democratic institutions, individual dignity and human wellbeing.

---

[1]Transatlantic Reflection Group on Democracy and the Rule of Law in the Age of 'Artificial Intelligence', 14 June 2021, link to sign and comment available at https://www.aiathens.org/manifesto.

In recognition of these challenges we, a group of scientists and stakeholders from both sides of the Atlantic, warn that technological solutionism should not replace democracy, that the primacy of democracy must be re-affirmed and that citizens must be re-empowered through institutions of countervailing power. Without immediate action, democracy runs the risk of faltering in the face of increasingly dominant AI-enabled platforms and inadequate governance structures.

Citizens and their elected, accountable representatives still lack the institutional means to govern these technologies and to hold their developers and providers accountable. The ubiquitous, pervasive, and often invasive, providers of these technologies have used their concentrated economic power to shield themselves from meaningful independent oversight. They work with unique power dynamics, including the 'winners take all' effects and a race for a limited pool of talent. Digitisation has led to the emergence of what we call hereafter private corporate hegemons. The challenges to both individual rights and democratic institutions by the power they wield include unaccountable governance of communication (controlling who and what gets heard in the public square), allowing the spread of mis- and disinformation, mass surveillance, and cyber-vulnerabilities and threats. Meeting these challenges requires more than just incremental legal adjustments on both sides of the Atlantic.

Governments worldwide desire to reap the economic benefits of technologies provided by the hegemons, while at the same time aiming to constrain their power. A fundamental mismatch exists, however, between the pace at which innovative yet destabilising digital applications can be deployed and the pace, as well as rigour, with which norms, standards and regulations are put in place. To complicate matters, traditional narratives around competition, security and unfettered innovation undermine the adoption of proper constraints. This creates unhealthy degrees of freedom for hegemons that drive a trajectory of the digital and technological revolution towards unprecedented forms of surveillance capitalism and strategic instability. Governments, stakeholders and citizens on both sides of the Atlantic have therefore rightfully expressed concern that this situation will continue to fragment the societies for which they hold responsibility, weaken democracy and the rule of law, as well as compromise fundamental human and constitutional rights.

In light of these challenges, we have come together in an interdisciplinary Transatlantic Reflection Group on Democracy and the Rule of Law in the Age of 'Artificial Intelligence' to address the systemic challenges to democracy emanating from monopolies and centralised governance of AI. We believe democracy and the rule of law themselves are at stake and we share reflections on the principles that should govern how these challenges are to be addressed.

## Technological solutionism should not replace democracy

Without historic, radical reform, citizens and their elected representatives will be disempowered and lose the means for effective self-governance. The promise of future technologies delivering economic growth cannot justify today's erosion of democratic norms, fundamental rights and the rule of law. Neither should the vulnerability and monopolisation of digitised systems jeopardise the peaceful cooperation of states. Unregulated technological deployment will exacerbate inequalities and undermine trust. The short-term benefits could be far outweighed by longer-term risks and undesirable societal as well as political consequences.

The challenges to institutions, laws and democratic processes—combined with the litany of claims that unregulated business interests can better address global challenges than democracy—have weakened trust in democracy and played into the hands of authoritarianism.

In this situation, there is a need to reaffirm that democratically established laws, by democratically elected and accountable representatives, are the noble and legitimate expressions of the people. To preserve these fundamental principles, radical reform is needed.

## Affirming the primacy of democracy

AI cuts to the heart of how we live. Decisions on how to govern such systems, their data and process oversight must not be decided by economic players who continue to overwhelm policy makers with demands to be either left alone or given special treatment.

Rather than stand by as witnesses to the erosion of democracy, we call for policy processes that empower citizens and guarantee vibrant, reflective and free societies, where citizens and regions can have *true* influence. Our societies must be based on horizontal and vertical divisions of power, and improved checks and balances to safeguard against monopolistic concentration and abuse, such as the abuse of democracy through regulatory capture.

The rules must go beyond technology-specific regulation, or the regulation of business practices. Like the technological and economic developments they are intended to address, they, by their nature, will influence how humans interact with each other and with their civic institutions, how democracy and markets function and how people live. Done well, however, they will ensure the rule of law curtails overreaches of power, by private or governmental actors.

These laws must serve the public interest and in doing so they may well be asymmetrical by creating stronger obligations that bind the big and powerful. To ensure that citizens are democratically empowered and can trust the legislative process at the local, national and supranational level, it is important that the law-making be accessible, clear and transparent and that the laws are not only enacted but also enforced.

## Empowering citizens through institutions of countervailing power

Democracies must foster and strengthen countervailing powers and the type of checks and balances necessary to control power in the age of AI. Countervailing powers can arise from scalable new technologies and business models on the one hand, and from effective and enforceable legislation on the other. Democracy must preserve space for both.

As a starting point, democracies must protect individuals and political systems from both governmental and non-governmental abuses of power facilitated by the targeted use of predictive technologies and personal data collection. Democracies must also prevent the weakening of local entrepreneurial activity through killer acquisitions and other anti-competitive behaviours.

Citizens and their elected representatives will be capable of responding to the challenges posed by the new technologies and new economic dynamics only if they are equipped with sound information about the real effectiveness and impact of the technologies. To that end, policy makers should address the need for an evidence-based public policy dialogue and to empower citizens and civil society to meaningfully participate. They should also encourage US–European cooperation in the development of AI benchmarking protocols in order to promote values-driven, evidence-based policy cooperation.

Where massive computing systems can effectively regulate human behaviour or dictate government behaviour, it is important that our societies preserve and strengthen the democratic accountability of policy actors and demand that those actors defend the public interest and work together to develop policies to avoid capture by private economic interests. Governments and legislators must equip themselves with their own, state-of-the-art science and technology impact assessment capabilities and share the results of any such assessments with the public. That should help to empower citizens and make them and their representatives less dependent on the sometimes incomplete or false information provided by corporations on technological capabilities, risks and solutions.

Countervailing power can also come from governmental authorities (e.g., consumer protection, data protection or competition authorities), non-governmental civic institutions (e.g., unions, non-governmental organisations, civil society, academia and the free press), and citizens themselves. That power can be effectively exercised, however, only if steps are taken to ensure that providers of technological products and services are held democratically

accountable, that mechanisms exist for citizens to assert their basic human and civil rights against economically more powerful actors, and that the public is well informed about both the benefits and the risks presented by the emerging technologies and business models.

Universities, media and civil society should be empowered to renew and strengthen their commitment to supporting the exercise of reason, inquiry for truth and informed opinion. The freedom of academics and civil society to criticise state and corporate conduct must be protected.

## Building bridges between technologists and policy communities

Independent technology experts are needed as participants in reliably inclusive democratic processes protected from private economic interests. While the number and importance of scientists and engineers in our societies has increased, their participation in public policy and formal democratic fora, such as parliaments, has declined. On the one hand, engineers and scientists should engage more in formal democratic decision-making institutions; on the other hand, political and democratic actors and institutions must build bridges for meaningful and visible engagement. Independent experts informing, training and collaborating with policy and decision makers must fill gaps in how governments understand technology and familiarise technologists and scientists with the specificities and complexity of decision-making in participatory democracies.

A broad array of perspectives are needed to formulate effective measures for understanding and mitigating the risks posed by advanced technologies. The role of technology as part of the proper functioning of our democracies should be informed by diverse and multidisciplinary stakeholders, from philosophers, youth representatives and labour unions to the impacted communities themselves.

## Joining forces: jointly defending democracy across the Atlantic

The survival of democracy on both sides of the Atlantic requires that American and European governments demonstrate their ability to act decisively and deliver efficiently in the face of great challenges. Without claiming perfection as to their democratic practices, public authorities and legislators in Europe and the Americas should join forces to support a new upward dynamic in order to develop effective legislative frameworks to address the challenges outlined here. It may be only through such cooperation and partnership that they are able to acquire the strength and reach needed to protect and empower the individual and defend democratic values against the hegemonial power of tech corporations.

With coherence across European and transatlantic jurisdictions, laws will have greater scale and will be more effective at addressing these challenges. Societies need not suffer from a competitive race to the bottom on standards for public life and protection of fundamental rights caused by free riding, forum shopping, and the exploitation of international tensions.

The fast pace of technological innovation and the economic success of the platform economy must not slow or erode the democratic process nor disempower individual human beings. While public institutions will need to reform to remain at the forefront of emerging technologies, this will be of little use if basic principles of self-governance are not maintained and protected through appropriate regulatory mechanisms and rigorously enforced.

Democratic deliberation to develop consensus, as well as the human ability to re-interpret legal norms in consideration of new technologies and new economic conditions are strengths, not weaknesses. A stable legal environment is crucial for accountability and certainty: while there is no doubt that legislation must evolve over time, democratic lawmakers should not be expected to publish and amend laws as frequently as software developers code, nor would this make for good law.

Technology regulation must not focus narrowly on zeitgeist trends. In contrast, technology-neutral laws, which are drafted in open language and without reliance on buzzwords, enable re-interpretation and will remain relevant as technologies and business models evolve. They must start with core values and principles and focus on what is needed to protect and advance those values and principles. The process of filling in the details should be left to delegated legislation, transparent standard-setting processes, and bodies responsible for enforcement.

We ask that US and European leadership remain committed to coherent laws, the primacy of the public interest, and the shaping of the digital economy through democracy on both sides of the Atlantic. We call on decision makers to remember the crucial importance of transatlantic coherence for reasons of both transatlantic democratic accountability and the rapidly advancing global competition. What is needed now are well-designed legal frameworks and strong institutions, which empower and enfranchise citizens and serve the common interest of people in Europe, the US and beyond, and ensure the following:

## FAIR COMPETITION AND TAXATION

1. **Competition law**: review competition rules to enable antitrust authorities to better pre-empt and tackle anticompetitive behaviour, including acquisitions of emerging competitors and the appropriation of innovative ideas by dominant incumbents, while reducing barriers to entry. Explore transatlantic regulatory cooperation to overcome the territorial market segmentation that ultimately favours transnationally operating digital corporations.
2. **Upskilling of supervisory authorities**: give supervisory authorities the mandate, skills and resources needed to understand, oversee and address how AI affects their respective domains.
3. **Address tax 'free riding'**: ensure that those who benefit from the digital economy the most, contribute financially to sustain core functions of democracy and public infrastructure, and pay for the undesirable societal impact of their technologies, through taxes where profit is generated.

## DATA GOVERNANCE

4. **Data quality**: ensure that data used to train AI systems with potentially major impacts is governed by legal frameworks that incorporate proper quality requirements, including reliability of testing and verification.
5. **Behavioural and biometric data**: ensure that behavioural and biometric data does not serve the training of AI systems capable of manipulation, discrimination and disinformation, in particular with regard to biometric profiling and emotion recognition technologies
6. **Data access**: ensure access to and use of data which is in the public interest, provided this does not interfere with human rights. Such access should also be ensured between services, especially when data and computation capabilities are held by companies, which calls for private and public open data policies and protocols that support interoperability as well as data portability.
7. **Transatlantic data flows**: create conditions of trust enabling transatlantic data flows based on the fundamental rights to data protection and privacy; create mechanisms of mutual protection and respect firmly grounded in 'effective and practical protection' within the relevant jurisdictions.

## FUNDAMENTAL RIGHTS

8. **Human rights and dignity**: establish practical and effective protection of human rights and liberties such as human dignity, non-discrimination, the presumption of innocence, due process, and the protection of children's (under age 18) rights.

9.  **AI safety**: put in place regulatory frameworks promoting AI governance, transparency, robustness, and cyberse-curity, update legislation to tackle unacceptable cases of algorithmic discrimination and limit corporations' ability to escape liability for their AI systems.
10. **Transparency and access**: supervisory authorities need access to government and corporate infrastructure, processes and ecosystems, including algorithms and databases, and policies to ensure adequate oversight and accountability. This should not be prohibited in the name of either governmental or corporate secrecy.

## INDEPENDENCE AND HUMAN AGENCY

11. **Free press and academia**: provide a framework for a vibrant, independent press and funding to foster independent academic and civil society organisations and empowering them to scrutinise and investigate the impacts, abuses and misuses of emerging technologies.
12. **Values-based technology design**: ensure all types of processes that include automated decision making and AI operate according to principles of responsibility and accountability, transparency, explainability, respect for human dignity and meaningful control. These values, the rule of law, democracy and fundamental rights must be protected *by design throughout the life cycle of the advanced software and cyber-physical systems*.
13. **Evidence-based decision-making and assessment**: address the need for the public policy dialogue to be evidence-based and for citizens and civil society to be empowered to participate meaningfully in this dialogue. Establish regular open AI benchmarks intended to soundly assess and report on the extent to which AI-enabled systems comply with the values set out above. Encourage the US, Europe and other interested parties to cooperate in the development of any such benchmarking protocols.

## NATIONAL AND INTERNATIONAL SECURITY

14. **Risk monitoring and mitigation**: ensure that emerging technologies, including those developed in the private sector, do not undermine national security or international peace in unforeseen ways. Such risks must be continuously monitored by supervisory authorities and addressed in an anticipatory manner.
15. **National security**: ensure public oversight over AI systems to keep them safe and secure. Identify mechanisms and instruments to better integrate safety, security and economic considerations in regulatory policy.
16. **AI in the military**: leverage towards a comprehensive treaty-based mechanism on the use of autonomous decision-making systems and AI; especially for military purposes.
17. **Fighting digital authoritarianism**: scale multilateral engagement on technical norms and standards to defend against digital authoritarianism and providing positive alternatives to authoritarian digital and physical entanglements by supporting bottom-up, self-determined digital development strategies.

## ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS AND SIGNATORIES

**SIGNATORIES (AS OF 8 JULY 2021).**

*Should you wish to become a co-signatory of this call to action, please fill out the form available at* https://www.aiathens.org/manifesto.

**Dr. Greg Adamson.**

Honorary, Computing and Information Systems, The University of Melbourne.

**Jakob Asslaender.**

Assistent Professor, New York University School of Medicine.

**Gezahgn Berhie Kidanu.**

Lecturer, Department of Journalism and Communication, Bahir Dar University, Ethiopia.

**Franziska Boehm.**

Vice President Intellectual Property Science, Leibniz Institute for Information Infrastructure Professor for IP Rights, Karlsruhe Institute for Technology.

**François Bry.**

Professor, Institute for Informatics, Ludwig-Maximilian University of Munich.

**Manfred Bürger.**

Former leader of the nuclear reactor safety department at IKE- Inst. Nuclear Energy, University of Stuttgart.

**Dr. Raja Chatila.**

Professor of Robotics and Ethics, Pierre and Marie Curie University, Paris Director of the Institute of Intelligent Systems and Robotics (ISIR).

**Lingstone Chiume.**

Lead Data Manager, Malawi-Liverpool-Wellcome Trust.

**Lord Tim Clement-Jones.**

**Petra Droste.**

Managing Director, Career Center, University of Bremen.

**Nicolas Economou.**

Chair, Law Committee, IEEE Global Initiative on the Ethics of A/I Systems Chair, Law, Science, and Society Initiative, The Future Society, Principal Coordinator, *The Athens Roundtable on AI and the Rule of Law*.

**Shirin Elahi.**

Director, Corset Economy.

**Anthony Giddens, Baron Giddens MAE.**

Member of the House of Lords, Fellow of King's College, Cambridge, UK.

**Louis Gitinywa.**

Former Public Prosecutor, Rwanda National Public Prosecution Authority Full-time.

**Dr. Inge Govaere.**

Professor of EU law/Director of G.E.L.I. at Ghent University (Belgium) and Director of the European Legal Studies Department at the College of Europe, Bruges.

**Giovanni De Gregorio.**

Postdoctoral researcher, Centre for Socio-Legal Studies, University of Oxford.

**Dr. Jan Peter Grevel.**

Koordination 'Ethik und Theologie im Evangelischen Oberkirchenrat' der Evangelischen Landeskirche in Württemberg, Goethe University Frankfurt.

**Dr. Bruce Hedin.**

Principal Scientist, H5.

**Professor Mireille Hildebrandt.**

Research Professor of 'Interfacing Law and Technology' at Vrije Universiteit Brussel and Professor of 'Smart Environments and the Rule of Law' at Radboud University in the Netherlands.

**Chris Jay Hoofnagle.**

Professor of Law in Residence, UC Berkeley.

**Maja Bogataj Jančič, LL.M.**

Head of Intellectual Property Institute, Slovenia, GPAI DG WG Co-Chair.

**Eva Kaili.**

Member of the European Parliament S&D Hellenic DelegationChair for Science & Tech #STOA #C4AI.

**Mantalena Kaili.**

Executive Director, ELONTech—European Law Observatory on New Technologies.

**Dr. Ing. Konstantinos Karachalios.**

**Leyla Keser.**

Professor, Director of IT Law Institute, Istanbul Bilgi University.

**Baroness Beeban Kidron OBE.**

Member of the UK House of Lords. Democracy and Digital Technologies Committee, Commissioner, UNESCO's Broadband Commission for Sustainable Development. Member, UNESCO Working Group on Child Online Safety.

**Alex Kotran.**

Co-founder, The AI Education Project Advisor, The Future Society.

**Robert Kroplewski.**

Solicitor, Kroplewski Law Office, Plenipotentiary of Minister of Digital Affairs for Information Society, Poland.

**Dr. Ralf Lankau.**

Professor, University of Applied Sciences Offenburg.

**Francesco Lapenta.**

Director, Institute of Future and Innovation Studies, John Cabot University.

**Ronald Leenes.**

Director, Tilburg Institute for Law, Technology, and Society, Professor in regulation by technology, Tilburg Institute for Law, Technology, and Society (Tilburg University).

**Lawrence Lessig.**

Roy L. Furman Professor of Law and Leadership, Harvard Law School, Founder of the Center for Internet and Society at Stanford Law School.

**Edward Madziwa.**

Human Rights Officer, Zimbabwe Human Rights Commission.

**Alessandro Mantelero.**

Associate Professor of Law, Polytechnic University of Turin.

**Nicolas Miailhe.**

Founder and President, The Future Society.

**Paul Nemitz.**

Principal Advisor on Justice Policy in the European Commission and Visiting Professor of Law at the College of Europe.

**Tuan Anh Nguyen.**

CEO of the Boston Global Forum (BGF), Director of the Michael Dukakis Institute for Leadership and Innovation (MDI). Co-founder, AI World Society.

**Prof. Alex 'Sandy' Pentland.**

Toshiba Professor of Media Arts and Sciences, MIT.

**Oreste Pollicino.**

Full Professor of Constitutional Law, Bocconi University.

**Michael Quartararo.**

President, Association of Certified E-Discovery Specialists (ACEDS).

**Paola Ricaurte.**

Associate Professor in the Department of Media and Digital Culture at Tecnológico de Monterrey, México.

**Marc Rotenberg.**

Executive Director, Center for AI and Digital Policy (CAIDP). Adjunct Professor, Georgetown Law.

**Andrea Rumler.**

Professor, Berlin School of Economics and Law.

**Edip Saliba.**

Azure Skills Lead, Microsoft.

**Sarjo Sama.**

Rule of Law, Justice and Security Monitoring and Evaluation Officer, UNDP Gambia.

**Luis Antonio Aguilar Sánchez.**

Subdirector de Área del Instituto Federal de Defensoría Pública, México.

**María del Carmen Patricia Álvarez Sánchez.**

Profesora de la Facultad de Derecho de la Universidad Nacional Autónoma de México.

**Giovanni Sartor.**

Professor in legal theory and legal informatics. CIRSFID-Alma AI, University of Bologna. European University Institute, Law Department.

**Marietje Schaake.**

International Policy Director at the Cyber Policy Center, International Policy Fellow at the Institute for Human-Centered Artificial Intelligence Stanford University, Former Member of European Parliament.

**Ingrid Schneider.**

Professor of Political Science, Ethics in Information Technology, Hamburg University.

**Dr. Tamar Sharon.**

Associate Professor, Radboud University Nijmegen.

**Dennis Snower.**

Professor, Hertie School of Governance, Berlin.

**Dr. Sarah Spiekermann.**

Full Professor & Chair, Institute for Information Systems & Society, Vienna University of Economics and Business. COO/Managing Partner, PwC Central and Eastern Europe.

**Michael Benjamin Strecker.**

Political advisor on digital politics, Social Democratic Party (SPD), Germany.

**Thomas Streinz.**

Executive Director, Guarini Global Law and Tech Adjunct Professor of Law, New York University School of Law.

**Jeroen van den Hoven.**

Professor, Ethics and Technology, Delft University of Technology.

**Carissa Véliz.**

Associate Professor, University of Oxford.

**Luis Gabriel Aguilar Virgen.**

Secretario del Juzgado Sexto de Distrito en el Estado de Veracruz, Mexico.

**Aleksandra Vukasinovic.**

Chief of the Cabinet, Constitutional Court of Montenegro.

**Wendell Wallach.**

Chair, Technology and Ethics Research Group, Yale Interdisciplinary Center for Bioethics.

**Christian Wolf.**

Professor Chair for Civil Law, German, European and International Civil Procedure, Leibniz Universität Hannover.

**Roman Yampolskiy.**

Associate Professor, University of Louisville.

**Shoshana Zuboff.**

Retired Professor, Harvard University Author, *The Age of Surveillance Capitalism*.